3 Myths That Hindered Israeli Success

As a writer, I admire the power of myth and recognize the important role it plays in culture. But as an Israeli citizen and reserve soldier who may be called to fight, it is disturbing to see how myth-making influences policymakers.

It is relatively easy to forgive the media for its role in distributing propaganda and making quick-draw assessments. After all, news organizations, in order to survive, need provocative content to increase audience size and boost advertising revenue.

Likewise, you can’t fault Arab leaders and their apologists for making false assertions that deflect blame, deny responsibility, and assert false victory. Arab leaders aren’t interested in self-criticism – totalitarian regimes never are – and their apologists would much rather blame European colonization, Israel’s existence, and American policy for all their woes. It’s far easier to blame others than to take responsibility for the sectarian violence, abject poverty, intolerance, militancy, radicalism, and abuse of women.

By comparison, Israelis are intensely self-critical. This approach drives innovation and opens the way for change, but it also keeps the country’s leaders – and therefore Israel’s allies and enemies alike – from recognizing important truths. Leaders are supposed to be able to differentiate between critical and irrelevant information when making decisions. Unfortunately, the Israeli political and military leadership failed their country and Western democracies because they gave credence to three myths that have gained status akin to fact because they have been widely circulated and often repeated by the media.

As a result, leaders have chosen a path that does not increase Israeli security or enhance regional stability. A critical mistake has been made, but it can be corrected. If it isn’t, the position of Islamic fascists will be greatly enhanced in the Middle East and around the world.

Israeli leaders acted as if they believed these three myths:

1. Operation Peace for the Galilee was a disaster for Israel. Throughout the 70’s, Israel was shelled and attacked by a powerful militia – the PLO – which was based in Lebanon after a failed attempt to overthrow the Jordanian government. In 1982, the Israeli government called up its reserves and used its full force against the PLO. Arafat was literally shipped to Tunis. Israeli cities in the north became safe. The invasion proved that a terrorist infrastructure can be dismantled if overwhelming force is employed. But public perception of success changed as the mission itself and the challenges faced evolved after the Israeli military established a security zone in Southern Lebanon. Israeli leaders today failed to distinguish between the results of the military offensive and the challenges faced by long-term occupation. The fact that Israeli Defense Minister Amir Peretz was a former leader in the Peace Now movement that advocated Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon may have influenced his inability to differentiate between the two, but he was not alone. Especially given the success of Operation Defensive Shield in 2002 – where the military also estimated that thousands of Israeli soldiers may die – it is unfortunate that Israeli leaders did not have the wisdom to understand that sustaining losses was critical to achieving a vital strategic goal. As usual, the Israeli civilian population was well ahead of its leaders. They demonstrated willingness to endure Hezbollah’s missiles for as long was necessary for the military to achieve its mission. Unfortunately, the Israeli government was too cautious and unwilling to take the necessary risks that ultimately would have led to success.

2. Israel withdrew from Lebanon in 2000 because of Hezbollah. As a guerilla organization, Hezbollah engagements against Israel were negligible until 1991. They weren’t even the most powerful Shia militia, until – thanks to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard – they overcame the more secular Amal. In 1991, their use of anti-tank missiles and roadside bombs led to an increase in Israeli casualties. Initially, the IDF fielded more forces in Lebanon to limit Hezbollah’s ability to conduct missions. As a result, the number of Israeli soldiers killed and wounded decreased dramatically. In 1995, the IDF fielded a new unit, called Egoz, which focused exclusively on anti-guerilla tactics. Egoz put Hezbollah on the defensive and the perceived threat from Lebanon was diminished. The success of Egoz influenced Israel’s decision to withdraw, but the decision was mainly the result of revitalized efforts to reach negotiated settlements with its neighbors. Israel signed a peace treaty with Jordan in 1994 and the Oslo Peace Process seemed on the verge of success when Israel removed its troops from Lebanon in May 2000. As expected, Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon was celebrated as if it were a victory for Hezbollah, when it really was a testament to the fact that they longer posed a significant threat. This may be another myth, but it has been said that the belief that Israel was defeated in Lebanon brought about the second Intifadah and Palestinian rejection of the settlement reached at Camp David several months later. Especially when the people of the Middle East are manipulated by government incitement to hatred as a method for deflecting internal dissent, Israeli military actions must always gain a clear victory that no amount of propaganda can reduce to failure. If Israel allows itself – out of its own tendency for self-criticism – to act tentatively and remain fearful of how it is perceived by an international community that does not have its best interests at heart, Israel will fail to secure its future and will have no one to blame but itself.

3. Ceasefires lead to peaceful conflict resolution. UN sponsored ceasefires rarely lead to conflict resolution, but negotiated settlements between two sovereign nations do. This is especially true with Lebanon because the country has been fractured and relatively decentralized since the start of its civil war in 1975. Even prior to the civil war, the Lebanese people did not completely control their own destiny. Since the PLO was the strongest militia in Lebanon, UN resolution 425 in 1978 didn’t stop the PLO from shelling Israeli towns. And after Israel sent the PLO packing, the Syrians and Iranians took control. That’s why the ceasefires in 1993, 1996, 2002, 2003, and 2005 did not create change. And that’s why it isn’t surprising that this year’s resolution, 1701, has already become neutered of meaning by the Lebanese Prime Minister, who has reneged on the most important element of the agreement, and the international community, which has significantly lowered the number of soldiers it will field and weakened the UNIFIL’s mandate. The resolution states that Southern Lebanon must be “free of any armed personnel, assets and weapons other than those of the government of Lebanon and UNIFIL,” but Hezbollah will now retain its arms in Southern Lebanon. Furthermore, not only will the Lebanese Army and UNIFIL refrain from destroying existing weapons caches, they won’t keep new weapons from entering Lebanon. UNIFIL will become larger, but it won’t become more effective or enable Lebanon to become the thriving, free, and democratic country its people asked for during the Cedar Revolution in 2005. Recent events in Southern Lebanon will be celebrated by Islamic fascists as if they had stormed the beaches of Normandy. And if the western world – whether through a strong Israeli military response or an international force – fails to demonstrate that it has the desire and ability to fully implement UN resolutions 1559 and 1701, it will be taken as yet another sign that secular, liberal democracies do not have what it takes to fight and defeat Islamic fascism. Islamic radicals around the world are watching and their next step will be a direct response to our future actions or inaction.

Israel & Hezbollah: Week 1

Along with many Americans and people around the world, I watch current events in the Middle East with great interest and concern. I worry over the loss of civilian lives on both sides of the conflict and I wonder when the region will finally know peace.

I approach the situation not as a political pundit, an academic, or interested outside observer, but as a soldier who could find himself serving in Lebanon or Gaza if the Israeli military needs to call up more reserve units.

Living and working just outside of Washington DC, I rely on the same news broadcasts as everyone else for information. And like others who have a personal connection to Israel or Lebanon, I gain additional tidbits from friends who live in the midst of the conflict.

It’s difficult to watch Israeli citizens suffer and not be part – even if only in a small way – of ensuring their security, but as of this writing, my reserve unit hasn’t been called up. Unlike Operation Defensive Shield in 2002, when Israel dismantled the Palestinian terror infrastructure in the West Bank and re-established military control over the area, there hasn’t been a large call-up of reserves. Up until now, the ground offensive in Lebanon and Gaza has been relatively limited in scale and the government has only authorized a minimal call-up of reservists.

That leaves me in DC, living as if I were still in Jerusalem. I pay close attention to the news, keep in touch with members of my unit, try to focus on work, tend to the needs of my pregnant wife, and attempt to enjoy the good things that happen each day. But mostly I’m waiting to be put to use and do my part.

Watching the images of soldiers making their way to Bint Jbail from my air conditioned home, I can almost feel the heat and dust of Lebanon during summer. I remember what it’s like to trudge across that hilly country wearing body armor that keeps in body heat more effectively than it keeps out bullets and a heavy assault vest that becomes light only after you use up ammunition engaging the enemy.

The mayor of Kiryat Shmoneh, a border town that has been under constant attack, spoke on Israeli TV recently. He told Israelis living in the relative safety of Tel Aviv and Jerusalem not to worry. “We’re ready to stay in the shelters for as long as it takes. Just let the army do its job.”

The willingness of Israelis to endure the shelling and the steady progress of the Israeli military demonstrates to radical Islamists like Hezbollah, Hamas, and Iran that western democratic nations have the will and the ability to defeat them.

A ceasefire at this stage – that does not include the immediate disarmament of Hezbollah – will be construed as capitulation on the part of Israel and the western world. This would feed the belief that the west will retreat when attacked. Failure to act decisively against Hezbollah will further embolden Syria, Iran, and radical Islamists in Iraq, Egypt, Jordan, and Indonesia as well as those living in the US and Europe.

If Hamas and Hezbollah are perceived as having won even the slightest concession from Israel or the international community, they will become stronger than ever. In fact, their mere survival as an organization will be celebrated as if it were a tremendous achievement of their own making – as opposed to the result of international concern for the impact this war is having on Lebanese civilians. And this expansion of radical Islam’s influence may silence once-moderate voices in the Middle East who will fear that the West won’t protect them.

It should be remembered that there has been a de facto ceasefire in place since Israel left Lebanon six years ago. Hezbollah and Iran used this time fortify military positions with underground bunkers and sophisticated equipment. Since 2004, Lebanon and the world community have called for Hezbollah to be disarmed. If the ceasefire that is being proposed by the UN and some European countries were to begin today, what would Hezbollah do? It has refused to disarm for two years, why would it do so now when a ceasefire proves that their strategy of hiding amongst civilians enables them to maintain power. If the proposed ceasefire takes place, Hezbollah will regroup and Iran will understand that the West’s is making empty threats against its nuclear ambitions.

The Israeli military has suggested that it needs seven to ten more days to complete its mission. I’m skeptical that Israel can accomplish in three weeks what the world couldn’t in two years. And I’m concerned that the timetable is being driven by political concern regarding probable international pressure for Israel to halt its offensive. Israel is capable of defeating Hezbollah militarily and it should be allowed to set its own timetable – whether it takes seven days or seven weeks – and it should do so with the full support of leading Western nations.

For only then will the supporters of radical Islam in the Middle East – Hezbollah, Hamas, Al Qaeda, and Iran – understand that the West has the strength to endure any attack and the endurance to do what it takes in order to defeat them. And when Israel does succeed, not only will Lebanon finally have a chance to become, once again, the Switzerland of the Middle East, but we may be closer to regional stability than we’ve been in decades.

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Over the last twenty years, the problem of radical Islam has grown exponentially. The current battle between Hezbollah and Israel is just one part of a much larger, more complex problem, but it does force a decision. When attacked by radical Islamists, what does a Western nation do? Do you negotiate in the hope that you’ll gain a few more years of quiet or do you take the necessary actions that ensure your enemy’s defeat?

Hezbollah as a military organization can be defeated by force of arms. And in this confrontation, it is vital that Israel, as representative of the Western, democratic world, demonstrate the ability to endure attacks and the will to defeat them. Accomplishing this, the West sends a powerful message to those who would seek our destruction. Failure sends an equally powerful message that will encourage our enemies to attack us and makes it more difficult for existing allies in the Middle East to remain supportive of American values and goals

Embracing Change: The Israeli Military Culture and Training Methodology

I read “Future Leader: The Journey of Developing (and Nurturing) Adaptability, The Future is Now,” written by Mr. Donald E. Vandergriff and published by the Future Center, with great interest. It was particularly fascinating to me because the approach proscribed for the development of future military leaders reminded me so much of my own past.

I was born, brought up, and educated in the United States, but in June 1990 I moved to Israel. Four months later I was serving with an Israeli paratrooper unit. My preconceptions of military culture and training were largely based on US war movies. Like most conscripts – be they American or Israeli – the day-to-day reality of military life is far different from the world imagined.

I was chiefly surprised by the relatively collegial atmosphere. I expected to be yelled at, have my personal space invaded, to be insulted, and even to be humiliated by commanders. I was not prepared for sergeants and officers who acted like nurturing mentors. They ran us into the ground, but they did it by encouraging us to succeed. Instead of trying to break us down in order to re-build us, they worked to understand our particular strengths and provide us with opportunities to excel. More importantly, they empowered us to figure out on our own the best way to accomplish our tasks.

Vandergriff writes that the US army wants to create “leaders of character who are ready, willing and able to make the right decisions in the face of adversity, be it the enemy, subordinates, peers or superiors, on and off the battlefield.” This statement also accurately describes the Israeli military ethos.

The concepts that lay at the heart of Vandergriff’s six-week Adaptive Leadership Course (ALC), the competencies valued by the program, and the behavior of the course instructors closely resembles the Israeli model.

Evaluating his experiment, Vandergriff lists several observed benefits and limitations of the course. According to Vandergriff, the course improves pattern recognition skills, decision-making, communication skills, and leadership development. The limitations include a difficulty simulating operating environments, failure to capture the on-going interactive nature of tactics or decision-making, the belief that the course works best only at the company level, and the inability to effectively apply the program to special operations.

Vandergriff’s evaluation of the benefits and limitations associated with his experiment at the Georgetown ROTC provide a valuable glimpse at the potential impact these concepts can have on a soldier’s development, but to gain a more comprehensive understanding of how the implementation of these concepts increases combat readiness, critical thinking, and the establishment of a learning organization, researchers may want to examine the Israeli training methodology more closely. For the Israeli military, these concepts are at the core of the military culture – from a soldier’s first moments during induction, throughout every stage of training, and even during real-world operations.

By fully integrating these cultural concepts with training and operations, Israeli soldiers gain all the benefits associated with critical thinking without suffering from the same limitations described by Vandergriff.

Selection and Training: It’s Always a Question of Character
As many people know, military service in Israel is compulsory. As a result of the tight integration between the military and civilian population, the values most admired by combat units are well-known. This, to some extent, enables a certain level of self-selection on the part of potential recruits. Recruits whose character reflects these traits gravitate toward combat units, while those who are self-aware enough to know that their temperament won’t meet expectations find alternative ways to fulfill their obligations.

Although it might seem counter-intuitive, physical strength and stamina are not highly valued. For instance, when recruits test for the paratroopers, officers evaluating performance mark down how many push-ups, pull-ups, and sit-ups a recruit achieves within a fixed period of time, but this information is mainly used as a baseline for gauging a recruit’s performance throughout the day-long entrance exam.

Throughout the testing, each group of recruits – anywhere between twenty and thirty individuals – is required to complete a number of tasks. The tasks can be as simple as running from Point A to Point B within thirty seconds. To complete the task, the recruits must run the distance and assemble in a series of rows before the allotted time elapses. The group will run back and forth as many times as are necessary until they succeed to complete the task on time. During these sprints, evaluators, who are aware of the individual strengths and weaknesses of each recruit, look to see if the stronger runners help other members of the group and monitor the resolve of those who are not as physically fit as their peers.

At other times, the group is given relatively complicated tasks – like finding a way to use a few pieces of provided equipment to get the entire group on the other side of a concrete wall without touching the wall. During these types of examinations, evaluators look to see which members of the group actively participate in the problem solving.

In addition, the testing process includes a series of physically draining tasks – carrying stretchers weighted with sand and continuous runs up and down hills with weight on shoulders – which are simply designed to provide the unmotivated with an opportunity to quit.

Evaluators attempt to identify recruits with high levels of determination (as evidenced by the willingness to continue despite obvious physical difficulty), team-players (demonstrated by helping others and active participation in solving group problems), thinkers (established by taking an active role in discussions and problem solving), and who demonstrate throughout the testing process a friendly, positive attitude.
Interestingly, an individual who exhibits remarkable athletic ability and coordination, but who is not perceived as having the valued character traits will not be selected to serve with the paratroopers.

Throughout the 14-18 month training period, commanders continuously monitor the behavior of recruits. Recruits who fail to demonstrate these desired character traits are not punished. Rather, officers, sergeants, and members of their own unit will impress upon them the value of these character traits through non-threatening, one-on-one discussions. If a recruit’s behavior improves, he is not explicitly rewarded. Those who fail to adopt the desired traits will either ask to leave the unit voluntarily or they might be asked to leave by commanders. Those who most closely embody the desired character traits are given additional responsibilities – such as communications, field medicine, sniper – for which they are esteemed within the unit and within society at large.

Typically, recruits who complete the entire training process leave the company-sized training group for one of four options.

1. Attend officer-training course. Depending on suitability, officers train new recruits or return to serve as officers within the battalion or division. Suitability to train new recruits is determined by demonstrating core character traits.
2. Attend non-commissioned officer training course. Depending on suitability, staff sergeants train new recruits or return to serve as sergeants within battalion.
3. Sent for additional training before returning to serve within battalion or division.
4. Sent directly to the battalion in order to serve with the primary assault group, reconnaissance, mortars, or anti-tank group. Suitability for each is determined by individual’s demonstrated aptitude during training.

Just because a recruit has demonstrated high levels of proficiency during training and combat missions does not mean that he is considered a suitable candidate for leading the next-generation of recruits. In fact, an individual’s personality and character traits are far more important than his technical proficiency.

First and foremost, leaders are expected to be smart, precise, innovative, hard-working, resolute, and likeable. Physical stamina and coordination are recognized as valuable traits that merely play a secondary importance to a soldier’s success.

Transforming Recruits Into Adaptive Leaders
From the very first day, new recruits discover that their actions as individuals directly impact the group. This idea is reinforced before, during, and after every training exercise and every activity. From the first moment recruits wake up, prior to every meal, between every training exercise, before going to sleep, and throughout the night, commanders devise creative ways to reinforce this idea. Although sprinting from point A to point B until the group completes the activity on time together is a favorite, recruits are asked to organize assault vests in rows prior to a lesson in tactics, set up targets prior to a training exercise, or organize the contents of their kitbags for inspection within a defined period of time.
In each instance, recruits are never told how to complete the task. They are only told the desired end-state and given a set period of time to accomplish the task. As a group, the unit must figure out the best way to achieve its goal on time. Units can repeat these mundane tasks literally ten times – often much more – before they work together effectively to complete the task on time. For much of a recruit’s first three months in the military, it seems as if life if measured in an endless series of tasks that he and his group are trying to complete in thirty seconds.

Recruits are also provided with a rationale for this focus on accomplishing tasks on time. Early on, recruits are told that this experience is meant to mirror the real world, where the success of a mission and the lives of people could depend on a unit being somewhere or accomplishing something by a specific time.

By the end of basic training, there is no longer any need to drill this concept into the minds of recruits. The lesson is learned. Proof of success is found when the unit consistently completes tasks on time.

Throughout those first few months, each recruit is provided ample opportunities for leadership. These opportunities manifest themselves in the form of helping to organize and support group efforts to complete tasks on time as well as within the context of training exercises.

Even at the earliest stages of fire and maneuver drills, where a three-man team attacks defended positions that lie ahead, recruits are only given basic instructions regarding their objective and the safety precautions they must take throughout the exercise. The leader of the three-man team is determined by the team itself. This individual gives the initial commands at the outset of the exercise, but a dialogue between the members of the small team – regarding what is seen and what next steps should be taken – is typical. To some extent, hitting the targets is a secondary goal behind learning how to communicate and act effectively as a small unit.

During basic training, most exercises focus on developing skills at the level of squad and platoon. Since the Israeli military understands that a unit’s commander may be killed in the first moments of any engagement, other members of the unit – even young recruits – should be comfortable taking command. For this reason, a unit’s commander if often “killed” or “wounded” during training exercises. Although the military has a clear chain of command – whereby a lieutenant takes over when a captain is wounded, etc – the military does not train recruits to wait for the next in line to take command. Rather, recruits are trained to understand that any one can take command and that the person closes to the issue – with a visual on attackers for instance – should feel empowered to direct the actions of other members of the team.

Fir instance, in a scenario where a commander – who leads from the front – is incapacitated, the radioman who is right behind him or the sniper on his left would be a far better position to direct the unit’s fire and maneuvering than another officer or sergeant who has been managing the force from the rear. But more important than the real-world implications of enabling a unit to react more quickly to contact with enemy fire, soldiers learn at the earliest stages of their lives as soldiers that they can and should be making command decisions.

As soldiers move further along in basic training and beyond, soldiers increasingly take on roles that are further up the chain of command. As a result, soldiers at every rank become more aware of how their unit’s actions fits within the larger strategy, increase their ability to coordinate with other forces taking part in operations, and become used to making command decisions.

Creating a Learning Organization
As Vandergriff points out, skills honed in a classroom or on the training ground don’t necessarily translate to the stress found in the field. This is not an issue for the Israeli model, which purposely places new recruits in operational environments during early stages of training.

This model serves two purposes. First, it enables commanders and soldiers to identify individuals who are not suited for the stress of combat at the earliest possible stage. Although officers and sergeants are all battle-tested, that doesn’t always mean that they are prepared to lead men into combat. Likewise, even the most technically proficient soldiers do not always function effectively when in the field. By gradually increasing the complexity of missions – from foot patrols in relatively calm environments and sweeps of villages to ambushes and arrests of wanted terrorists – the military is able to identify who is fit and who is not. If commanders or soldiers are not able to overcome the challenges that make it difficult for them to function in hostile environments, they transfer to support units.

Second, this enables soldiers to gradually gain experience with real-world combat situations and slowly gain the ability to deal with the related stress, learn to integrate what is experienced to improve techniques during training, and gives them the confidence to trust their own judgment.

An important facet of the Israeli training model is that debriefings are taken very seriously. They are employed at the end of every exercise and every action – whether it’s a brief fire and maneuver exercise by a three-man team, the arrest of a wanted individual, or a division-wide operation. From the very beginning, recruits are encouraged to ask questions – even ones that are critical of the purpose or nature of the exercise. During these debriefings, commanders don’t just take the time to answer every question, but use the forum as an opportunity to create an informative discussion regarding key strategic, tactical, or cultural issues that may arise. The goal of these discussions is to improve effectiveness by clarifying roles, exposing missed opportunities, and advancing new ways to solve the problems encountered. During these discussions, the group attempts to achieve consensus regarding best practices.

As recruits gain more experience, both by way of additional training and real-world experience, they increasingly feel comfortable voicing opinions that are different from their commanders and commanders feel more inclined to take their soldier’s feedback into account during future planning. Beyond increasing a soldier’s comfort with thinking critically, the dialogue between commanders and soldiers makes the adoption of new methods and techniques more likely. As new ideas evolve at the level of squad and platoon, there is a framework that enables, in fact encourages and rewards, lower echelon commanders who promote new ideas up the chain of command.

Furthermore, the Israeli military has a systematic program for the cross-pollination of new ideas and techniques. In Israel, officers and sergeants who are selected to train and lead new recruits often have served in different units. For instance, a company commander for the paratroopers may have served as the commanding officer of an elite reconnaissance unit associated with the Air Force, Shaldag, and some of the staff sergeants may have served with other elite units, like the Israeli SEAL unit, Commando Yami. Likewise, individuals who served with the paratroopers might end up training new recruits that have joined either the Golani or Givati brigade.

As with every military, each of these units have their own culture and slightly different methods for training and executing tactics. By enabling soldiers from different units to work together to train new recruits, the Israeli military facilitates the emergence of a constantly evolving culture that combines the best elements of each unit and that embraces change as the best way to achieve the common goal of creating a more effective fighting force.

Broadening the Concept of Information Warfare

From the purported placement of pro-coalition articles in the media, the embedding of reporters with troops, and the pervasive use of Information Warfare (IO) in the field, it’s clear that the US understands the importance of shaping perceptions locally, internationally, and on the home front.

Certainly, these activities influence the understanding of individual events, but existing methods have failed to alter the local perception of the US as occupier, the low opinion of US policies held by a majority of people around the world, and the growing belief in the United States that the war in Iraq is a losing proposition that is being badly mismanaged.

This inability to shape critical perceptions of US policy results from the US failure to develop a clear message that is consistently communicated at all levels and that takes into consideration the multiple audiences it must influence.

Clearly, any strategy must take into account the likelihood that a policymaker will misspeak (characterizing US efforts in Iraq as a crusade) or that mistakes on the ground (mistreatment Iraqi citizens) will occur. There are always going to be hiccups and any IO strategy will have to take into account those possibilities and be so pervasive that incidents that reflect poorly on the US will be perceived – by all audiences – to be a clear deviation from the wider vision being propagated.

But even in a perfect world, where everyone says the right thing at the right time, no one is misunderstood, and every individual working on behalf of the US fulfills his or her duty flawlessly, today’s concept of IO would still be too narrow to play a significant role in the defeat of our current and future enemies.

When done well, current IO campaigns can successfully counter and mitigate the impact of specific insurgent claims against coalition soldiers (by disproving false assertions of misbehavior of troops at a mosque), they can call attention to successful operations that demonstrate US military or Iraqi police capabilities (and the ancillary weakness of the insurgents), and they can even promote the success of US development programs, but even a sustained drum beat of pro-coalition news will not reframe the debates taking place in Iraq, in the US, and around the world regarding the US presence in Iraq. More importantly, they do not significantly weaken our opponents, widen the circle of those who support our mission, nor compel individuals at all levels of government and the military to act as if failure is not an option.

Similar to the marketing and public relations activities of a small start-up company, US IO campaigns tend to focus on the features of its products (every time an Iraqi battalion or police unit is certified ready for duty) and feels the need to promote every modest success within a specific vertical (the installation of a water pump that supports village X in area Y). These efforts are very inward looking – how product cool.1 is different than cool.2 – monologues that attempt to tell people all the cool things about their product. But a company’s target audience, even those who will directly benefit from all of those features, are only want to know how cool.1 and cool.2 improves their lives. Even a company that has superior technology will fail unless it transitions to a marketing and PR strategy that clearly demonstrates how its products benefit customers.

Even if the US military were to keep its IO strategy relatively narrow, it still would need to mirror the best practices of leading global brands like Coca Cola, GE, Cingular, and Microsoft to succeed in its mission.

At the heart of any successful mass communication strategy is the development of a clear message that reflects the capabilities of your organization while encapsulating the dreams of your customers. That’s why taglines like “Bring good things to life” and messages like “Raising the bar” increase consumer confidence and ensure the success of these companies.

But developing a coherent message is only the first step. It’s vital that every message and action delivered by members of an organization conform to the communication plan. Moreover, the members of an organization should be asking themselves, their colleagues, and their superiors whether planned actions live up to the brand they are trying to build. Successful organizations have members who are constantly asking questions like “Are we bringing good things to life? and “Does this demonstrate that we’re raising the bar?”

In short, the IO must promote the US as if it were a brand and employ the same strategies and tactics of mass communications that leading global companies use to get their message across to a variety of audiences. This will require a comprehensive, multi-year, adaptive communications plan that is developed with the input of the appropriate DoD, intelligence, and federal civilian organizations. The plan would include segmentation by the various constituent audiences and the roll-out would be sequenced to ensure maximum effect in the short-term as well as the achievement of long-term objectives.

To succeed, extensive coordination is required. Although members of various agencies and organizations currently meet to coordinate planning and the execution of joint projects, the US still lacks a true integration of purpose and plan. Despite the chain of command within the military, the hierarchy within US civilian organizations, and the communication tools that are readily available, true synergistic relationships have yet to be established. Currently, the level of integration is dependent on the personalities, capabilities and resources available to commanders in the field. Even as the military becomes more modular and the resources available in any given area won’t change every time battalions replace each another, greater integration is needed to ensure that the actions taken and the messages delivered by every organization – at all levels – is consistent with the communications platform that is at the core of the IO strategy.

Also, US military and civilian organizations will be working alongside NGOs. NGOs will have their own agendas and may even be disinclined to assist US organizations that are attempting to achieve stability by way of addressing security concerns and by way of development programs. Just like leading global companies, the US must look upon every organization working within a field of operation as a potential partner and competitor. For this reason, programs that are designed to develop positive working relationships –that are based on mutual self-interest with NGOs – must be established.

Organizations that typically prefer not to be directly associated with the US and even those who tend to propagate messaging that undermines US objectives can be influenced. The Microsoft Partner Program (MSPP) is a wonderful example of transforming competitors into partners who can be monitored and influenced. Instinctively, companies in many markets are wary of Microsoft, but at the same time tens of thousands actively participate in the MSPP because it provides tools, support, and a framework that provides value to their organizations in a variety of ways – including networking opportunities, improving brand credibility by association, access to business intelligence, and lead generation. From Microsoft’s perspective, a monitoring of the partner program exposes them to critical trends, relationships, product positioning, and new business opportunities. By creating a framework of collaboration – at which they are the center – they mitigate competition, create new opportunities for their company, and increase the reach of their brand exponentially.

By adopting the Microsoft partner strategy, and even some of the tactics, the US military could establish a framework that enables closer coordination with organizations that are currently wary of developing ties with the US and transform potential critics into advocates.

In the November-December 2005 issue of Military Review, Lieutenant Colonel Garry J. Beavers, U.S. Army, Retired, offered the following definition of IO: “Offensive and defensive information operations that convey true, unclassified information about military opera¬tions and the information environment to external audiences.” In his view, Public Affairs (PA) – which “develops information for internal (US and coalition) audiences while supporting an information campaign designed to reach external audiences – should function as a separate apparatus. But given the ubiquity of electronic, cable, and satellite means of distribution, external and internal audiences typically consume the same information today. CNN distributes Aljazeera. Iraqis watch President Bush speaking to an audience in Columbus Ohio. Indonesians read and respond to articles posted on Haaretz.com – a website supported by a leading Israeli newspaper.

Realizing that every communication must reach a variety of audiences is essential to the success of an IO strategy, but in today’s world you need a single communication platform that speaks to each audience simultaneously. In this way, every communication, from the high-level ten second pitch (the sound byte-level rationale for war, for instance) to the ground-level detailed conversations (discussions between a battalion commander and a local leader) must be in complete synchronization. As with leading global brands, the US needs to think in terms of the tagline, the elevator pitch, messaging, market segmentation, customer profiles, direct marketing, guerilla marketing, viral marketing, and partnering.

But broadening the US concept of IO requires more. It’s not just about transforming the US into the most beloved brand on planet Earth. America’s enemies aren’t fighting for narrow political or economic interests. They are motivated by broad ideological and religious imperatives. In his recent letter to President Bush, the President of Iran, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, made it clear that liberalism and Western-style democracy “have not been able to help realize the ideals of humanity.” This echoes Sayyid Qutb, the intellectual father of Islamic fundamentalism, who has written, “Western civilization has nothing else to give humanity....The dominance of Western man has reached its end. The time has come for Islam to take the lead.” And these thoughts reverberate in coffee houses around the Muslim world and virtual communities on Orkut that unequivocally support bin Laden and insurgent actions in Iraq.

Insurgents engage coalition forces in combat, but untold numbers are fighting against the concept of modern western civilization. The United States and her allies are fighting a determined enemy that can be beaten, but not broken by current means at the military’s disposal. Given the typical length of time required to defeat an enemy in an asymmetric conflict, endurance is critical to achieving victory. Current and future enemies will all have a long-term strategy. They will think and plan in terms of decades and centuries, not months and years. In order to receive the resources the military needs – in terms of materials, manpower, and authority – Western civilian populations must understand that this struggle poses an existential threat.

Israel, which has endured steady conflict with its neighbors since its independence in 1948, demonstrates the value of achieving a tight integration between the civilian population and military community. Certainly, this integration benefits from mandatory conscription and yearly reserve duty of men from all sectors of society. But this sense of shared purpose has been seriously tested over the last seventeen years (since the onset of the first Intifada). Despite the deep division within the country regarding Israeli military and political control over the West Bank and Gaza, motivation for service in combat units and reserve duty participation remains high.

The country continues to produce successive generations of youth who are eager to join frontline units – thereby making entrance to the best units as competitive as gaining acceptance to the best universities in the West – and the country maintains an extraordinary large (given the size of the general population) reserve force. Even during the most heightened period of political discord, this did not change. In fact, levels of participation and motivation have only continued to grow. In part, this is because Israelis widely believe that they are under an existential threat from their Arab neighbors. Therefore, even if a majority of the population disagrees with the policies and military tactics employed in the West Bank and Gaza, there still remains widespread agreement that the Israeli military needs to maintain its competitive edge against its potential enemies. And as a result, even those people who disapprove of government policies encourage their sons and daughters to participate in the military. Moreover, even people who disapprove of government policies, continue to train and serve with their reserve units.

Simultaneously creating and leveraging an Israeli civilian culture that is tightly integrated with the Israeli military culture, the Israeli military takes pains to establish a direct connection between a soldier’s training and nearly four thousand years of Jewish history. As a result, Israeli soldiers don’t just see themselves as protectors of the modern country of Israel, they see themselves as filling an essential role that has kept the Jewish people safe for thousands of years. When Israeli soldiers shout “never again” during their swearing in ceremony, they are harking back to the defenders of Masada in 72 CE, remembering the Warsaw ghetto uprising, and know that the future of the Jewish people, wherever they are in the world, depend on their vigilance and determination.

Israeli commanders and soldiers do not perceive themselves as merely serving narrow political and economic interests or as simply performing tasks that increase the country’s security. Soldiers are conscious of the real-politic rationale and the real-world effect of their actions, but at the same time they are made to understand that every action they take directly impacts the future of their nation. For instance, failure to capture a terrorist doesn’t just possibly lead to the death of fellow citizens; it may also cause peace negotiations to end. Or the inadvertent killing of a Palestinian civilian through negligence could spark riots that create a spiraling chain of events that leads to war. Causing soldiers to understand that every action they take has the potential for catastrophic consequences eliminates the possibility of failure as an option.

Israel has long recognized the value of integrating its IO and PA. Of course, that does not mean that Israel has distinguished itself as consistently providing an effective IO strategy. That said, the Israeli IO strategy that took shape during Operation Defensive Shield in 2002 demonstrates the impact of an effective strategy.

Prior to this period, the Israeli IO strategy resulted in a politically divided country, increased hatred of Israelis by Palestinians, extensive political pressure being placed on Israel by the US and other Western nations that severely limited the military’s freedom of action. Here is the summation of the Israeli IO between 1989 and 2002.

These lands were thrust on us by war. This is our ancestral land and we have as much right as anyone to settle it. We are willing to negotiate land for peace, but we have no credible partner. When we have a partner, we’ll give up control of the land. Until then, we will administer these territories in a way that is just and humane.

The failure of the Israeli IO during this period is demonstrated by the lack of acknowledgement on the part of Israelis, Palestinians, or the international community regarding the fact that the lives of the Palestinian people had been improved dramatically by Israeli administration of the West Bank and Gaza.

Israel established six universities and empowered these institutions to select their own curriculum – thus making them some of the freest in the Middle East. In addition, Israel permitted a free and open press as well as the election of mayors in major cities decades before the Oslo Accords. In addition, the Palestinian economy grew rapidly and health conditions improved dramatically.

Even when Israel let PLO leaders return, allowed them to establish the Palestinian Authority, and relinquished administrative and military control over most of the West Bank and Gaza as part of the Oslo Accords in 1993, the Israeli military and intelligence community was under tremendous internal and external pressure to restrain its activities. This occurred despite a sharp rise in terrorism that led to heavy civilian losses in Israel. Interestingly, the Palestinian political leadership and paramilitary forces retained freedom of movement and action throughout this period.

The tangible and measurable improvements to the standard of living and quality of life in the West Bank and Gaza were mostly ignored by the Palestinian population and the world community. And while the failure on the part of the Palestinian leadership to meet its obligations was met with understanding in Israel and the world, Israel remained under tremendous pressure to accede to Palestinian political aspirations.

In this way, the failure of the Israeli IO strategy between 1989 and 2002 directly impacted the way in which the conflict unfolded and limited Israel’s freedom of action. In fact, for more than twenty years, Israel attempted – at various stages and in different ways – to win the “hearts and minds” of the Palestinian population. Every attempt failed to bridge political gaps or reduce the level of violence on the ground. In fact, violence increased as the Palestinians approached their political goals.

This all changed when the Israeli government adopted a new IO strategy prior to the launching of Operation Defensive Shield. A central component of the Israeli strategy was the development of a central narrative that galvanized Israeli public support for security policies, ensured freedom of action by mitigating international pressure, and demoralized the enemy. The Israeli IO strategy communicated the following:

The Palestinians have rejected a fair offer of peace. Since then, Israeli citizens have been bombarded by murderous attacks. For nearly ten years, Israel has restrained itself, but now it has reached a point where it must protect its citizens.

The primary difference between the old and new IO strategy is that Israel developed a clear message that focused on its universally accepted right to protect its citizens. This message was not complicated by an assertion of territorial rights over the West Bank and Gaza. The IO made it clear that Israeli actions were being taken only to protect the lives of its civilian population.

For the Israeli military, the IO strategy was essential the successful launching of Operation Defensive Shield. As a result, the emergency call-up of reserves (the largest call-up since the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982) was met with overwhelming public support. In fact, the Israeli military had large numbers of people, who were not obligated to serve, coming to induction centers around the country in order to volunteer. Not only did the IO strategy establish internal cohesion, but it also mitigated external pressure. Prior to this period, a large-scale deployment of the Israeli military in the West Bank and Gaza was not feasible. Moreover, the success of Operation Defensive Shield has enabled the Israeli military and intelligence community complete freedom of action. As a result, Israel is able to conduct counter-insurgency operations continuously without concern for international or domestic pressure to pull back.

Certainly, the successful implementation of the tactics in the field was crucial to the success of the strategy. If, as had been feared at the operation’s outset, that thousands of Israeli soldiers would be killed or wounded during the re-occupation of the West Bank and Gaza, Israeli public support may have evaporated. As a strategic tool, IO can shape the battlefield – the number and type of soldiers a military can field, freedom of action, and the number and type of combatants a military will face – and help ensure that the aftermath leads to victory, but soldiers still need to defeat the enemy they face. As always, the fate of war depends on the actions taken by individual soldiers on the ground.

Given the freedom of action they needed, the Israeli military and intelligence community have reduced the number of successful Palestinian attacks by 90%, decreased the number of citizens killed by 70%, and lowered the number of wounded by 85% in the same time period.

In addition, a poll conducted by Beirzeit University in October 2005, after the completion of the Israeli disengagement plan, shows a significant reduction in Gaza of Palestinian support for groups that commit terrorist acts. Also, according to the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR), Palestinian attitudes regarding violence, especially suicide attacks, have dropped sharply to its lowest level in seven years. Support for suicide attacks have dropped from 77% in 2004 to 29% in 2005.

Currently, Israel continues to evolve the IO strategy in such a way as to create a political and military advantage over the Palestinians. The recent disengagement from Gaza serves to undercut the main element of the story of occupation that Palestinians rely on for political leverage. By disengaging from Gaza, Israel takes a first step toward changing the way it is understood by its own citizens and the world.

The success of the new political party in Israel, Kadima, whose platform commits its members to take actions that fulfill the vision promoted by the Israeli IO strategy, demonstrates the enduring nature of a successful IO strategy. And today, four years after its re-occupation of the West Bank and Gaza, the Israeli military conducts counter-terrorism operations in Gaza and frames them as purely defensive without concern for external or internal pressure.

The Israeli IO strategy is not comprehensive enough to serve as a template for the US, but the elements that promote internal cohesion and deeper integration between the civilian population and the military community may serve as a basis for discussion. For instance:

• The US military must be perceived as being more than a force employed by political, security, and economic drivers to safeguard the prosperity of the American people and ensure their defense.

• The members of the US military, at all levels, must see themselves primarily as playing a vital role in the wider narrative of democracy and freedom. US soldiers and civilians must come to view today’s military as the guarantors of peace, prosperity, and liberty that didn’t just start with the minutemen, but harks all the way back to the small Greek navy that defeated the Persian armada at Salamis.

• The missions soldiers are asked to undertake and their behavior at all times must be aligned with the wider national culture in order to heighten the sense of duty, increase the motivation to succeed, and further integrate the military with the civilian population.

• An IO strategy must be based on an unassailable universal ideal or a clearly defined and immediate existential threat that can not be refuted or subverted.

• An IO strategy must also take into account the fact it will be appropriated and contextualized over time. For this reason, the narrative constructed must be acceptable and meaningful to citizens at home, soldiers in the field, allies abroad, and the indigenous population which we aim to protect or support.

In addition, US planners must move past the assumption that greater economic, political, religious, and cultural freedom will lead an indigenous population to embrace our presence, adopt our worldview, and reduce friction between competing groups in the region.

Beyond the example of the Palestinian reaction to the economic and political benefits they gained from the Oslo Peace Process, the Iraqi reaction to US presence in Iraq serves as another example of the limitations of a strategy that is based on “winning hearts and minds.”

Even though the United States and her allies have freed the Iraqi people from the rule of a brutal dictator and despite the billions of dollars in US treasure spent, the more than two thousand US lives lost, and over fifteen thousand US soldiers wounded on their behalf, the United States is still perceived by our closest allies in Iraq as a benevolent occupier.

The US sees itself as a liberator and hopes to win “hearts and minds” through every day interactions between US representatives – both civilian and military – as well as good works carried out by NGOs, USAID, and the US military. Unfortunately, after three years, the insurgency has become increasingly sophisticated and the number of enemy combatants has grown. In fact, during the recent elections, even our supporters took part in a joint statement of all Iraqi factions that specifically cited that attacks against US soldiers was permissible.

The US has improved the lives of millions, but a single image transmitted by Aljazeera that reflects Arab preconceptions regarding US immorality or suspicions regarding US motivations can undermine efforts to establish a shared vision of the future, increase our enemy’s rate of recruitment, and damage US civilian support for the military.

Even prior to the march to Baghdad, the US placed a great deal of value on democratization, legitimization of pro-US Iraqi political leaders, massive reconstruction projects that were meant to improve the lives of the average Iraqi citizen, and ROEs that were designed to minimize civilian casualties.

Unfortunately, the Iraqi people perceive the US as an occupier despite the positive impact the US has had on their lives. A recent assessment by Ken Pollack at the Brookings Institute suggests that political progress will not decrease insurgent motivation. He believes that the US military will need to confront a growing insurgency for many years to come if the US remains committed to the idea of creating a stable, democratic Iraq.

Also, John Lynn, writing for the Small Wars Center for Excellence published in Military Review, that the US can not win the hearts and minds of the Iraqis. Lynn suggests that the US can only provide security and work to establish trust.

Many factors have contributed to the Iraqi people’s reaction to the US presence. Certainly the years of anti-US propaganda to which Iraqi citizens have been bombarded for decades through local and regional media contributed to the Iraqi people’s response.

For this reason, US planners must develop a comprehensive and flexible IO strategy that adopts the best practices of leading global brands, evolves throughout the life of our presence within an area of operation, and takes into account the policies of democratic countries that have enabled integration between their military and civilian populations.

Publishers Weekly
Starred Review. Released at a time when soldier memoirs seem to be a dime-a-dozen publishing phenomenon, Harmon's entry should be celebrated as much for what it isn't as what it is. This is an even-paced, detailed, deliberate account of a sincere New Englander's move to Israel in 1990, where he enlists as a paratrooper just before the beginning of the Gulf War. Despite his weak grasp of Hebrew, Harmon graduates from basic training and soon finds himself guarding the country's borders and volunteering for raids against known and suspected terrorists. Throughout his service in the West Bank and Lebanon, he maintains a measured tone sympathetic to the hardships of neighboring Palestinians, even as he's called back from civilian life following an upswing in violence. For such a strictly chronological account-not merely day-to-day but at times moment-to-moment-Harmon's work is surprisingly captivating. Though he isn't always able to distinguish between pertinent and expendable information, Harmon's voice is so consistent and genuine that it's impossible not to identify with his steadfast journey. An illuminating account of a much-covered conflict, this is a memoir for anyone who wants a look behind the daily headlines.