Recycled Solutions Won’t Stop the Cycle of Violence
Once again, Israelis and Palestinians are on the verge of another international conference, more confidence building measures, and leaders are making statements designed to prepare Israelis and Palestinians for political concessions. It could be 1991 just before the Madrid Conference, 1993 after Oslo, 2000 at Camp David, Wye River, Sharm el-Sheikh, or Taba.
Instead of a Nobel Prize winning Rabin-Arafat handshake on the White House lawn, Israeli Prime Minister Olmert and Palestinian President Abbas talk quietly in Jericho about security coordination, reducing the Israeli military presence in the West Bank, and a final status agreement. Israeli and Palestinian leaders seem to think that it’s possible and advisable to turn back the clock to 2000, but the same obstacles to peace still remain, new challenges have emerged, and the last seven years of conflict have lessened public readiness to make peace.
By merely retracing the steps taken by their predecessors, today’s leaders virtually guarantee that the cycle of violence will continue and that their citizens will needlessly endure additional years of bloody conflict.
Ironically, the deal has already been struck, if not signed. The Palestinians will have a contiguous state that spans the West Bank and Gaza. Israel will give up a portion of its territory to make that possible. In exchange, the Palestinians will accept that an equal amount of West Bank territory will become part of Israel. In addition, the Palestinians and Israelis will share Jerusalem and a just solution for Palestinians living abroad will be found. This is inevitable, but it will be further delayed years, if not decades, because Olmert and Abbas continue to follow a process that is unnecessary and fundamentally flawed.
Today, as with the 90’s, the Israeli-Palestinian peace process has two tracks. One track focuses on confidence building measures like the removal of checkpoints, prisoner releases, economic aid, members of terror organizations symbolically relinquishing arms, and limited security cooperation. Meanwhile, another track concentrates on the broader core issues like national borders, Jerusalem, and the future of Palestinians living abroad. In theory, the process builds momentum for peace and progress on one track helps support movement on the other.
Unfortunately, Oslo demonstrated that this step-by-step, drawn-out process does not work in the real world. History shows that Palestinian opposition groups, acting to derail the process and challenge the Palestinian Authority leadership, will carry out a number of terror attacks that force an Israeli military response. As the frequency of Palestinian attacks and the tempo of Israeli military responses increase, political concessions are harder to make. The inevitable failure to achieve results on the confidence building track undermines the entire process. In the end, political progress halts and violence intensifies.
In the 90’s, Hamas suicide bombers played a key role in making the Oslo Peace Process drag on for over seven years. Now Hamas controls Gaza and is strengthening its position in the West Bank. Meanwhile, Abbas is even losing control over Fatah-sponsored terror groups, like the Al-Aksa Brigades. Today’s relative calm will not last long.
For this reason, it is vital that Israeli and Palestinian leaders take immediate steps to dramatically change Israeli-Palestinian relations. A true rapprochement between these two nations is possible, but it will require a willingness on both sides to take genuine risks.
The key to success depends on a Palestinian leadership that is willing to fully embrace collaboration with Israel. Palestinian Authority leaders must make a steady stream of public announcements and enact policies that enable the Palestinian people to understand that the era of Israeli-Palestinian conflict is over and has been replaced by a strategic alliance that is critical to the establishment of a Palestinian state.
The centerpiece of this alliance will be the training of a professional Palestinian military by Israeli soldiers and a comprehensive economic development program for the West Bank and Gaza that is jointly administered by the Palestinian Authority and Israel.
The risks are clear. Palestinian Authority leaders would become politically vulnerable at a time when they need all of their strength to consolidate power. Moreover, opposition groups may consider Palestinian Authority leaders legitimate military targets. In addition, Palestinian leaders would have to relinquish their strongest propaganda tool, the rhetoric and policies of a resistance movement. For Israel, the risks include the very real possibility that a much improved Palestinian military would be more difficult to subdue if the conflict resumes. Also, given that Palestinian soldiers have attacked Israeli soldiers during joint patrols in the past, Israeli soldiers would face the possibility of being shot by presumed allies during training and joint operations.
The benefits are equally clear. Without the assistance of a robust external military force, the western-leaning Palestinian Authority will not gain central control over all of its people and it will soon lose its battle with radical groups like Hamas and Islamic Jihad. Israel is the only country in the world that has both the military capability and the willingness to take on Hamas. Working together, the Palestinian Authority and the Israeli military can defeat the radical Islamic organizations and keep them from rising again.
Further, Palestinians need to see Israelis in new, positive ways that are condoned by Palestinian political and cultural leaders. Israel has a better track record than Europe when it comes to managing development projects and stimulating an economy that lacks natural resources. Given Israel’s capabilities, deep interest, and the need to transform Israeli-Palestinian relations, Israelis should be collaborating directly with Palestinians on development projects, not just interested parties from Europe and America.
Any dramatic step forward would require the active support of American and European leaders. Moreover, Palestinian leaders would need assurance that neighbors like Lebanon, Jordan, and Egypt as well as Gulf states like Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain, UAE, and Kuwait all vocally support the Palestinian alliance with Israel against radical Islamists and avidly refute any suggestion of capitulation or weakness on the part of the Palestinian Authority. They must be willing to broadcast on their national radio and television news programs images of Israeli and Palestinian soldiers squaring off together against radical groups like Hamas, while providing commentary that supports those efforts. After all, the de-legitimization of radical groups like Hamas and Islamic Jihad are in their national interests as well, given the growing strength of similar groups in their own countries.
The Palestinian people are the most free, secular, homogenous, and educated population in the Arab world. They want a central, democratic, and relatively secular government. If the radical Islamists are not defeated soon, this will never be achieved. And even though Israelis have built a thriving economy and one of the most liberal democracies in the world, the country yearns to live in peace with its neighbors.
Israelis and Palestinians can both achieve their national aspirations. All it takes is the willingness to collaborate and end this cycle of violence.
Once again, Israelis and Palestinians are on the verge of another international conference, more confidence building measures, and leaders are making statements designed to prepare Israelis and Palestinians for political concessions. It could be 1991 just before the Madrid Conference, 1993 after Oslo, 2000 at Camp David, Wye River, Sharm el-Sheikh, or Taba.
Instead of a Nobel Prize winning Rabin-Arafat handshake on the White House lawn, Israeli Prime Minister Olmert and Palestinian President Abbas talk quietly in Jericho about security coordination, reducing the Israeli military presence in the West Bank, and a final status agreement. Israeli and Palestinian leaders seem to think that it’s possible and advisable to turn back the clock to 2000, but the same obstacles to peace still remain, new challenges have emerged, and the last seven years of conflict have lessened public readiness to make peace.
By merely retracing the steps taken by their predecessors, today’s leaders virtually guarantee that the cycle of violence will continue and that their citizens will needlessly endure additional years of bloody conflict.
Ironically, the deal has already been struck, if not signed. The Palestinians will have a contiguous state that spans the West Bank and Gaza. Israel will give up a portion of its territory to make that possible. In exchange, the Palestinians will accept that an equal amount of West Bank territory will become part of Israel. In addition, the Palestinians and Israelis will share Jerusalem and a just solution for Palestinians living abroad will be found. This is inevitable, but it will be further delayed years, if not decades, because Olmert and Abbas continue to follow a process that is unnecessary and fundamentally flawed.
Today, as with the 90’s, the Israeli-Palestinian peace process has two tracks. One track focuses on confidence building measures like the removal of checkpoints, prisoner releases, economic aid, members of terror organizations symbolically relinquishing arms, and limited security cooperation. Meanwhile, another track concentrates on the broader core issues like national borders, Jerusalem, and the future of Palestinians living abroad. In theory, the process builds momentum for peace and progress on one track helps support movement on the other.
Unfortunately, Oslo demonstrated that this step-by-step, drawn-out process does not work in the real world. History shows that Palestinian opposition groups, acting to derail the process and challenge the Palestinian Authority leadership, will carry out a number of terror attacks that force an Israeli military response. As the frequency of Palestinian attacks and the tempo of Israeli military responses increase, political concessions are harder to make. The inevitable failure to achieve results on the confidence building track undermines the entire process. In the end, political progress halts and violence intensifies.
In the 90’s, Hamas suicide bombers played a key role in making the Oslo Peace Process drag on for over seven years. Now Hamas controls Gaza and is strengthening its position in the West Bank. Meanwhile, Abbas is even losing control over Fatah-sponsored terror groups, like the Al-Aksa Brigades. Today’s relative calm will not last long.
For this reason, it is vital that Israeli and Palestinian leaders take immediate steps to dramatically change Israeli-Palestinian relations. A true rapprochement between these two nations is possible, but it will require a willingness on both sides to take genuine risks.
The key to success depends on a Palestinian leadership that is willing to fully embrace collaboration with Israel. Palestinian Authority leaders must make a steady stream of public announcements and enact policies that enable the Palestinian people to understand that the era of Israeli-Palestinian conflict is over and has been replaced by a strategic alliance that is critical to the establishment of a Palestinian state.
The centerpiece of this alliance will be the training of a professional Palestinian military by Israeli soldiers and a comprehensive economic development program for the West Bank and Gaza that is jointly administered by the Palestinian Authority and Israel.
The risks are clear. Palestinian Authority leaders would become politically vulnerable at a time when they need all of their strength to consolidate power. Moreover, opposition groups may consider Palestinian Authority leaders legitimate military targets. In addition, Palestinian leaders would have to relinquish their strongest propaganda tool, the rhetoric and policies of a resistance movement. For Israel, the risks include the very real possibility that a much improved Palestinian military would be more difficult to subdue if the conflict resumes. Also, given that Palestinian soldiers have attacked Israeli soldiers during joint patrols in the past, Israeli soldiers would face the possibility of being shot by presumed allies during training and joint operations.
The benefits are equally clear. Without the assistance of a robust external military force, the western-leaning Palestinian Authority will not gain central control over all of its people and it will soon lose its battle with radical groups like Hamas and Islamic Jihad. Israel is the only country in the world that has both the military capability and the willingness to take on Hamas. Working together, the Palestinian Authority and the Israeli military can defeat the radical Islamic organizations and keep them from rising again.
Further, Palestinians need to see Israelis in new, positive ways that are condoned by Palestinian political and cultural leaders. Israel has a better track record than Europe when it comes to managing development projects and stimulating an economy that lacks natural resources. Given Israel’s capabilities, deep interest, and the need to transform Israeli-Palestinian relations, Israelis should be collaborating directly with Palestinians on development projects, not just interested parties from Europe and America.
Any dramatic step forward would require the active support of American and European leaders. Moreover, Palestinian leaders would need assurance that neighbors like Lebanon, Jordan, and Egypt as well as Gulf states like Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain, UAE, and Kuwait all vocally support the Palestinian alliance with Israel against radical Islamists and avidly refute any suggestion of capitulation or weakness on the part of the Palestinian Authority. They must be willing to broadcast on their national radio and television news programs images of Israeli and Palestinian soldiers squaring off together against radical groups like Hamas, while providing commentary that supports those efforts. After all, the de-legitimization of radical groups like Hamas and Islamic Jihad are in their national interests as well, given the growing strength of similar groups in their own countries.
The Palestinian people are the most free, secular, homogenous, and educated population in the Arab world. They want a central, democratic, and relatively secular government. If the radical Islamists are not defeated soon, this will never be achieved. And even though Israelis have built a thriving economy and one of the most liberal democracies in the world, the country yearns to live in peace with its neighbors.
Israelis and Palestinians can both achieve their national aspirations. All it takes is the willingness to collaborate and end this cycle of violence.
Labels: Gaza, IDF, Islamic Radicals, Israel, Military, Oslo, Palestine, Peace Process, Terrorism, West Bank
posted by Adam Harmon at
3:34 PM
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