A Military Surge Will Not Shock and Awe
The current debate over the value of a military surge suggests that decision-makers finally understand that we can’t achieve our strategic goals without having more boots on the ground.

The number of additional soldiers being discussed ranges between 20,000 – 40,000. This would bring the total number of coalition troops in Iraq to about 200,000. This is a large force, but it is actually only 50% of the troops required. According to the Brookings Institute, about 400,000 troops would be needed to stabilize Iraq. This isn’t just an academic exercise. General Shinseki told U.S. decision-makers more than three years ago that several hundred thousand troops would be required for post-war Iraq, but the administration chose not to listen.

The administration and the military can turn things around and Iraq can still become a success story, but this will only happen when decision-makers recognize that the escalating violence and lawlessness over the past three years is the direct result of deploying too few troops.

Hopefully the recent appointment of a new Secretary of Defense will bring new thinking and these estimates will be taken seriously because stability and security in Iraq will remain an unfulfilled goal until there are at least 400,000 foreign soldiers who are tasked with keeping the peace.

Israel’s recent history demonstrates the critical importance of having enough boots on the ground. In 2002, when suicide bombings steadily increased until they became nearly daily events, the Israeli military swept into the West Bank with about 20,000 reservists and took control. By deploying enough ground forces for Operation Defensive Shield and by maintaining troop levels over the years, Israel has reduced attacks by over 90%. For the U.S. to have the same level of physical coverage over Iraq as Israel has over the West Bank, the U.S. would need approximately 500,000 troops.

Compare Israel’s success in 2002 to its failure to achieve key objectives in Lebanon last summer. In 2006, the Israeli military deviated from its proven strategy and severely limited the number of troops allowed to enter Lebanese soil. As a result, Israeli troops were able to clear towns, but unable to hold them. Further, even though the Israelis won every firefight, they did not achieve complete control over Lebanese territory. This is very similar to the U.S experience in Iraq. Recognizing that the strategy failed, the Israeli military is preparing to enable the deployment of large-scale forces if it becomes necessary in the future.

We must keep in mind that our enemies can do the math. They know that it took over 6,000 U.S. troops to secure a city the size of Fallujah, even though the Mehdi Army quickly melted away alongside the civilian population. If the individual who is considered to be "the most dangerous accelerant" of sectarian violence in Iraq, Muqtada al-Sadr, orders his men to stand and fight, the number of U.S. forces required to take control of Fallujah could triple overnight. One man can tie down a significant number of the additional troops sent over and al-Sadr knows it. Worse, U.S. forces are dealing with multiple sources of violence. Trouble doesn’t spike in one spot at a time. If al-Sadr turns up the heat, the U.S. will still have to contend with Sunni insurgents, criminals, and Al Qaeda.

If the size of the coalition presence in Iraq remains seriously understaffed, those who oppose U.S. nation-building efforts will continue to stall development projects, terrorize citizens, target Iraqi officials, and attack U.S. forces. An additional 40,000 troops will not significantly impact the security or stability of the country.

We’ve arrived at a turning point in Iraq and what happens next will directly impact U.S. security and its place in the world for decades to come.

With enough boots on the ground and a comprehensive strategy for nation-building, Iraq can still become a success story. But a stable, unified, and prosperous Iraq will only arise if 400,000 – 500,000 soldiers are deployed across the country.

The additional troops shouldn’t come from the U.S., which already bears the brunt of the burden. The U.S. must remind Europeans that a destabilized Middle East will harm their interests more than our own and we must convince them to share the burden more equally. And within the region, instead of focusing on the countries that are trying to thwart us at every turn, as has been suggested by the Iraq Study Group, we should turn to Saudi Arabia and other gulf states that have a vested interest in a stable Iraq. They know that a US withdrawal will devastate the region and should be willing to provide soldiers, police, and other useful personnel like translators. And Egypt, which has one of the most powerful military forces in the region, is eager to demonstrate its leadership to the Arab world. We should let them.

The Coalition of the Willing, which has provided token political and military support over the years, must be transformed into a United Front that is deeply committed to Iraq’s stability.

The manpower needed is available and there is wide consensus that a stable Iraq is in everyone’s interest. We just have to ask nicely and say thank you. Surely, we wouldn’t let pride keep us from enabling our soldiers to achieve their mission, providing the Iraqis with the security required for nation-building, and giving Middle Eastern countries a chance to actively participate in the stabilization of their own region.

What if Bush is Right?
Given the false claims regarding WMD, the cynical blurring of Al Qaeda and Saddam Hussein, the hubris of deploying only 20% of the troops needed for post-war stabilization, and the daily loss of life, it’s easy to be a critic of US policy in Iraq.

After more than three years of increasing violence, it is abundantly clear that U.S. and Iraqi forces are not going to create stability in Iraq. And at last, the US government is ready to reevaluate its strategy. This is a good thing.

But the highly partisan debate – both domestically and internationally – has stymied thinking. U.S. leaders, European politicians, Middle East rulers, and UN diplomats have only come up with two solutions. U.S. forces should either stay or they should go.

Ironically, there is wide consensus that a reduction in US military presence in Iraq will cause the country to fall further into chaos until a civil war either fragments the country or enables a winner to take all. In either case, the Sunni-Shia violence in Iraq – that is already to some extent a proxy war between Iran and Saudi Arabia – will likely spill across the rest of the region.

Frustration with this administration’s failure to achieve economic, political, or military results makes people eager for a solution. Any solution. And in a political environment that seems to suggest that we either have to stay the course or get out of dodge, the latter certainly seems the most sensible choice.

But what if President Bush is right and we must achieve victory in Iraq.

Iraq had nothing to do with the War on Terror before we arrived, but it does now. The US must remain completely engaged in the creation of a thriving, stable democracy in Iraq. Not only because of a kindergarten logic that dictates that we clean up our mess before we leave, but because failure will encourage nations challenging the U.S. to follow through on plans that will make the world less stable and Islamic radicals will redouble their efforts against Western culture through terrorism and intimidation.

We’ve arrived at a turning point in Iraq, but what happens next will directly impact U.S. security and its place in the world for decades to come.

The choice is not between staying or going, it’s between an escalating violence that extends beyond the region or increasing the number of boots on the ground. That leaves us with only two questions. How many and where from.

The number of troops required is already known. General Shinseki told U.S. decision-makers three years ago that we’d need several hundred thousand troops. The Brookings Institute has estimated that at least 400,000 soldiers would be needed, based on the size and population of Iraq.

Those numbers aren’t just part of an academic exercise. Between 2000-2002 there was a steady up-tick in suicide bombings within Israel, culminating in daily attacks by the spring of 2002. Israel launched Operation Defensive Shield to retake control over the West Bank using 20,000 reservists. By maintaining troop levels over the years, Israel has reduced the number of successful Palestinian attacks by over 90%. To have the same level of physical coverage over Iraq as Israel has over the West Bank, the U.S. would need approximately 500,000 troops. A surge of 20,000-30,000 additional troops – which represents only a 15-20% increase – is too small to have a net positive impact on stability.

The Iraq Study Group – which is comprised of 9 politicians, 1 judge, and no military strategists – recommends withdrawal and a regional conference with all the players. Dozens of these conferences have been tried before without result. Just ask Mr. Baker about Madrid. Besides, if we don’t have the power, the influence, or a strategy to effect positive change in Iraq, what makes us think we can fix the region as a whole? The US military has a number of forums, like the Unified Quest Seminar Series, that bring together experienced military, law enforcement, and development professionals to discuss strategy and tactics. The findings of these seminars need to play a more prominent role in planning.

Instead of opening up a diplomatic channel that will enable Iran to achieve its nuclear ambitions and Syria to regain control over Lebanon, diplomatic efforts should focus on gaining commitments for additional troops on the ground.

And with additional troops, the U.S. will finally be able to focus attention on our primary task, which is nation-building. Earlier this year, the US State Department considered absorbing USAID in order to streamline US development projects throughout the world and better align these projects with US foreign policy. Great idea. Wrong agency. Instead of merging USAID with the State Department, we should tightly integrate USAID with the military. Development projects in Iraq fail because the country lacks security. And as Catch 22 would have it, Iraq lacks security, in part, because development projects aren’t able to improve the lives of the country’s citizens.

Instead of making the reduction of violence in a particular town or region a battalion’s mission, let’s make the successful implementation of a regional school system the primary military objective. And make a countrywide development strategy the framework for the military, whereby military plans serve mainly to facilitate logistics and provide security for these programs.

We must remind the Europeans that a destabilized Middle East will be harmful to their interests and we must convince them to share the burden more equally. And within the region itself, instead of focusing on the countries that are trying to thwart us at every turn, we should turn to Saudi Arabia and other gulf states that have a vested interest in the success of Iraq. They already know that a US withdrawal will devastate the region and may be willing to participate. And Egypt, which has one of the most powerful military forces in the region, is eager to demonstrate its leadership to the Arab world. We should let them.

We don’t need a Coalition of the Willing that provides token political and military support. We must lobby for committed allies who understand the importance of success and who want Iraq to succeed just as much as we do.

With enough boots on the ground and a comprehensive strategy for nation-building, Iraq can still become a success story.