French Ceasefire Surrenders Opportunity for Strategic Victory

Israeli military and political leaders have acted wisely in the planning and execution of this operation. They have clearly learned from mistakes made during the 2006 conflict with Hezbollah, but Israeli leaders seem to be on the verge of missing the opportunity to achieve a strategic victory – to end Hamas rule in Gaza and eliminate its military organization.

Contrary to popular opinion, there are military solutions to political problems. The US military surge in Iraq created the conditions for stability and political progress in Iraq. Likewise, the continuation of the current IDF operation in Gaza will create conditions for political progress between Israelis and Palestinians. Ironically, the calls to stop fighting and start talking will lead to further bloodshed – and not just between Israelis and Palestinians. The strongest voices in favor of a ceasefire are from countries that are thousands of miles away from the actual conflict. Those neighboring governments most affected by Hamas rule over the Gaza Strip – the Palestinian Authority (PA) and Egypt – are not nearly as keen about the ceasefire and have both been very critical of Hamas.

For the PA, the internationally recognized government and leadership of the Palestinian people, Hamas is the organization that removed it from power in Gaza by way of a military coup. During the first day of the Israeli operation, a leading member of the PA stated that they would be ready to take control of Gaza if Israel dislodges Hamas. For Egypt, Hamas is an armed off-shoot and strong supporter of the Muslim Brotherhood, the Mubarak regime’s primary political competitor. And all Sunni Arab regimes considered moderate by the western world – from Saudi Arabia and Jordan to Bahrain – would view the destruction of Hamas as a valuable blow to the growing Iranian Shi’a threat.

The French ceasefire proposal would actually ensure the survival of an organization that is officially designated – by the French, the European Union, and the United States – a terrorist organization.

Even a brief ceasefire provides Hamas with time to reorganize, plan, reassert control over Gaza, and ready itself for future attacks. Hamas will not be satisfied with being the de facto rulers of Gaza. The West Bank -- where analysts believe Hamas would already have control if it were not for the Israeli military presence in the area – is next. Future attacks on Israel are assured and attempts to destabilize moderate regimes like Jordan and Egypt are likely.

A ceasefire only postpones the inevitable conflict between Israel and Hamas. Better for Israel to finish off Hamas now than wait until later, when Hamas has become more powerful – politically and militarily. A ceasefire under current conditions would greatly enhance Hamas political clout, just as it did for Hezbollah. And no matter what controls are discussed, Hamas will re-arm.

Given the recognition by foreign governments that Israel is justified in its determination to neuter Hamas military capabilities and the fact that the destruction of Hamas is also in the vested interest of Israel’s Arab neighbors, Israel has the legitimacy required to replicate the successful strategy of Operation Defensive Shield.

As with Operation Defensive Shield in 2002, Israel should call up an additional 20,000 reservists and deploy them alongside 15,000 members of its standing army. Together, these ground forces will be able to rapidly dominate Gaza. Once Hamas is removed as a threat, the PA will immediately assert itself as the legal authority to administer the rebuilding of Gaza. Arab nations like Saudi Arabia and Western donor nations will welcome PA control over Gaza and will donate funds to enable reconstruction. The PA would not reject the opportunity to regain control over Gaza because of the perception that it relied on – and therefore would become associated with -- an Israeli military operation to achieve this goal. The desire to be the sole ruler of all Palestinian people again would override this concern and the PA would counter-balance this perception by its statements and actions. No one will mistake the PA for an Israeli surrogate – in many ways this type of arrangement between the PA and Israel in the West Bank today.

While the PA military and police forces – especially those trained recently by US General Jones – assert control over Gaza, IDF forces would need to continue conducting pinpoint operations to ensure that Hamas is unable to reconstitute itself. As with the West Bank today, Israeli intelligence and infantry units would conduct these ongoing counter-insurgency operations while the PA administers the day-to-day life of the Palestinian civilian population, including coordination with Israel to open the border crossings. The Israeli military operations would be continuous, but they would not necessarily require a base of operations with Gaza once PA forces enter.

To ensure the legitimacy of the PA, planned elections for 2009 should go ahead, but with one small change. Organizations that fail to meet the international standards for a Palestinian government – the willingness to accept prior agreements signed by the PA, the recognition of Israel, and the renunciation of terrorism – will not be able to participate in Palestinian national elections. This will eliminate Hamas from the process and ensure that the current PA leadership the opportunity to finalize a peace agreement with Israel and significantly improve the lives of the Palestinian people.

The cost in Israeli lives to dismantle Hamas and essentially liberate the Gaza Strip for the Palestinian Authority may be high. As a reserve soldier who would likely participate in that operation, I believe that the long-term security gained for both Israelis and Palestinians would justify the cost.
If instead, Israel and the international community revert to policies that have consistently failed in the past, we will have missed a historic opportunity to create a catalyst for peace, will weaken the position of moderate Arab nations, and strengthen the determination of Islamic radicals to confront the West.

When To Cease Fire

The Israeli military has racked up several remarkable achievements in the last week, but the hard part is still ahead of us – and I’m not just referring to the ground invasion. Israeli leaders must withstand the mounting pressure to halt the operation prematurely.

Moments after Israel launched its operation, European leaders were calling on Israel to stop. They were not alone. Leaders and groups from across the world are calling on Israel to halt its military operations. The response of these nations and groups are reflexive and expected. This is how the West reacts to violence in the Middle East. The mantra is “Stop fighting. Start talking.”

That’s a nice sentiment when you’re at café, university, park, or government office thousands of miles away from the actual conflict. Egypt borders both Israel and Gaza. They explicitly blame Hamas, have shown considerable understanding of Israel’s actions, and call on Hamas – not Israel – to unilaterally halt its attacks. Palestinian leaders in the West Bank bluster, but they were eager to mention on the first day of Israel’s operation that they are ready to take control of Gaza if Israel dislodges Hamas.

The governments most affected by Hamas rule over the Gaza Strip – the Palestinian Authority and Egypt – aren’t suggesting that Israel engage Hamas in dialogue. They understand something that much of the Western world has still failed to internalize – you can’t convince Islamic radicals to stop being Islamic radicals. I am not suggesting that Islamic radicals aren’t rational. They are very rational and many of their leaders are politically sophisticated. It’s just that their strongly held beliefs – which are essentially incomprehensible to a Western mind that has detached itself from religious and ideological thinking – lead them to see Israel as a cancer and the West as a poison that must be eradicated at all costs.

No one is going to convince the Hamas leadership to live side-by-side with Israel in peace and harmony. That is never going to happen. If they agreed to live side by side with Israel – something they have rejected continuously – they wouldn’t be Hamas anymore. That’s why nothing can be gained by entering into dialogue with them and that’s why violence is sometimes necessary. In this case, conflict between Israel and Hamas might be critical to the achievement of peace between Israel and the Palestinians. The destruction of Hamas and the subsequent re-introduction of Palestinian Authority control over Gaza would enable forward momentum in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process that is currently not possible.

Even a brief ceasefire provides Hamas with time to reorganize, plan, and ready itself for additional attacks. A longer ceasefire – that leaves Hamas intact as the de facto rulers of Gaza – only postpones the inevitable conflict between Israel and Hamas. Better for Israel to finish off Hamas now than wait until later, when Hamas has become more powerful.

The cost in Israeli lives to dismantle Hamas and essentially liberate the Gaza Strip for the Palestinian Authority may be high. As a reserve soldier, who is likely to put on his uniform in the weeks to come, I can honestly say that achieving that objective would justify the cost.

At this stage, taking away Hamas control over Gaza is not the stated objective of the Israeli government. Their goals are more modest. They want to cause Hamas to re-evaluate their strategy of firing daily rockets at Israeli cities. There is precedence for this approach. In 2004, Israel caused Hamas to re-evaluate its strategy of sending suicide bombers into Israeli cities by killing Hamas leaders Yassin and Rantisi in quick succession. It is possible that today’s Hamas leaders, fearing for their lives and realizing that they are in danger of losing political power over Gaza, will meet Israel’s minimum requirement – which is to stop firing rockets and mortars at Israeli cities.

If that is the primary goal of Israel’s leadership, then they should not deploy Israeli ground troops en mass. Instead, they should continue conducting pinpoint missions that are aimed at specific Hamas leaders and institutions until the remaining Hamas leaders give in.
This approach could give Israel another year of relative quiet in the South, but the country will be eventually forced to deal with Hamas since the Palestinian Authority is unable to reconstitute itself in Gaza on its own. The cost in human life will be lower today – for both Palestinians and Israelis – than in the future. Also, success in Gaza will serve to augment Israeli deterrence with Hezbollah, Syria, and Iran. A strong Israeli deterrence is what keeps future wars from occurring.
Israeli political and military leaders must resist calls – by either foreign interested parties or internal audiences – to accept ceasefire proposals that don’t meet the minimum requirement of an immediate cessation of hostilities on the part of Hamas and a mechanism for ensuring that Hamas does not re-arm.

To achieve that end, the Israeli military can either continue targeted killings of high ranking Hamas officials while destroying Hamas symbols of power until the organization concedes defeat or the Israeli military must employ enough combat troops to enable rapid IDF domination of the Gaza Strip.