Broadening the Concept of Information Warfare

From the purported placement of pro-coalition articles in the media, the embedding of reporters with troops, and the pervasive use of Information Warfare (IO) in the field, it’s clear that the US understands the importance of shaping perceptions locally, internationally, and on the home front.

Certainly, these activities influence the understanding of individual events, but existing methods have failed to alter the local perception of the US as occupier, the low opinion of US policies held by a majority of people around the world, and the growing belief in the United States that the war in Iraq is a losing proposition that is being badly mismanaged.

This inability to shape critical perceptions of US policy results from the US failure to develop a clear message that is consistently communicated at all levels and that takes into consideration the multiple audiences it must influence.

Clearly, any strategy must take into account the likelihood that a policymaker will misspeak (characterizing US efforts in Iraq as a crusade) or that mistakes on the ground (mistreatment Iraqi citizens) will occur. There are always going to be hiccups and any IO strategy will have to take into account those possibilities and be so pervasive that incidents that reflect poorly on the US will be perceived – by all audiences – to be a clear deviation from the wider vision being propagated.

But even in a perfect world, where everyone says the right thing at the right time, no one is misunderstood, and every individual working on behalf of the US fulfills his or her duty flawlessly, today’s concept of IO would still be too narrow to play a significant role in the defeat of our current and future enemies.

When done well, current IO campaigns can successfully counter and mitigate the impact of specific insurgent claims against coalition soldiers (by disproving false assertions of misbehavior of troops at a mosque), they can call attention to successful operations that demonstrate US military or Iraqi police capabilities (and the ancillary weakness of the insurgents), and they can even promote the success of US development programs, but even a sustained drum beat of pro-coalition news will not reframe the debates taking place in Iraq, in the US, and around the world regarding the US presence in Iraq. More importantly, they do not significantly weaken our opponents, widen the circle of those who support our mission, nor compel individuals at all levels of government and the military to act as if failure is not an option.

Similar to the marketing and public relations activities of a small start-up company, US IO campaigns tend to focus on the features of its products (every time an Iraqi battalion or police unit is certified ready for duty) and feels the need to promote every modest success within a specific vertical (the installation of a water pump that supports village X in area Y). These efforts are very inward looking – how product cool.1 is different than cool.2 – monologues that attempt to tell people all the cool things about their product. But a company’s target audience, even those who will directly benefit from all of those features, are only want to know how cool.1 and cool.2 improves their lives. Even a company that has superior technology will fail unless it transitions to a marketing and PR strategy that clearly demonstrates how its products benefit customers.

Even if the US military were to keep its IO strategy relatively narrow, it still would need to mirror the best practices of leading global brands like Coca Cola, GE, Cingular, and Microsoft to succeed in its mission.

At the heart of any successful mass communication strategy is the development of a clear message that reflects the capabilities of your organization while encapsulating the dreams of your customers. That’s why taglines like “Bring good things to life” and messages like “Raising the bar” increase consumer confidence and ensure the success of these companies.

But developing a coherent message is only the first step. It’s vital that every message and action delivered by members of an organization conform to the communication plan. Moreover, the members of an organization should be asking themselves, their colleagues, and their superiors whether planned actions live up to the brand they are trying to build. Successful organizations have members who are constantly asking questions like “Are we bringing good things to life? and “Does this demonstrate that we’re raising the bar?”

In short, the IO must promote the US as if it were a brand and employ the same strategies and tactics of mass communications that leading global companies use to get their message across to a variety of audiences. This will require a comprehensive, multi-year, adaptive communications plan that is developed with the input of the appropriate DoD, intelligence, and federal civilian organizations. The plan would include segmentation by the various constituent audiences and the roll-out would be sequenced to ensure maximum effect in the short-term as well as the achievement of long-term objectives.

To succeed, extensive coordination is required. Although members of various agencies and organizations currently meet to coordinate planning and the execution of joint projects, the US still lacks a true integration of purpose and plan. Despite the chain of command within the military, the hierarchy within US civilian organizations, and the communication tools that are readily available, true synergistic relationships have yet to be established. Currently, the level of integration is dependent on the personalities, capabilities and resources available to commanders in the field. Even as the military becomes more modular and the resources available in any given area won’t change every time battalions replace each another, greater integration is needed to ensure that the actions taken and the messages delivered by every organization – at all levels – is consistent with the communications platform that is at the core of the IO strategy.

Also, US military and civilian organizations will be working alongside NGOs. NGOs will have their own agendas and may even be disinclined to assist US organizations that are attempting to achieve stability by way of addressing security concerns and by way of development programs. Just like leading global companies, the US must look upon every organization working within a field of operation as a potential partner and competitor. For this reason, programs that are designed to develop positive working relationships –that are based on mutual self-interest with NGOs – must be established.

Organizations that typically prefer not to be directly associated with the US and even those who tend to propagate messaging that undermines US objectives can be influenced. The Microsoft Partner Program (MSPP) is a wonderful example of transforming competitors into partners who can be monitored and influenced. Instinctively, companies in many markets are wary of Microsoft, but at the same time tens of thousands actively participate in the MSPP because it provides tools, support, and a framework that provides value to their organizations in a variety of ways – including networking opportunities, improving brand credibility by association, access to business intelligence, and lead generation. From Microsoft’s perspective, a monitoring of the partner program exposes them to critical trends, relationships, product positioning, and new business opportunities. By creating a framework of collaboration – at which they are the center – they mitigate competition, create new opportunities for their company, and increase the reach of their brand exponentially.

By adopting the Microsoft partner strategy, and even some of the tactics, the US military could establish a framework that enables closer coordination with organizations that are currently wary of developing ties with the US and transform potential critics into advocates.

In the November-December 2005 issue of Military Review, Lieutenant Colonel Garry J. Beavers, U.S. Army, Retired, offered the following definition of IO: “Offensive and defensive information operations that convey true, unclassified information about military opera¬tions and the information environment to external audiences.” In his view, Public Affairs (PA) – which “develops information for internal (US and coalition) audiences while supporting an information campaign designed to reach external audiences – should function as a separate apparatus. But given the ubiquity of electronic, cable, and satellite means of distribution, external and internal audiences typically consume the same information today. CNN distributes Aljazeera. Iraqis watch President Bush speaking to an audience in Columbus Ohio. Indonesians read and respond to articles posted on Haaretz.com – a website supported by a leading Israeli newspaper.

Realizing that every communication must reach a variety of audiences is essential to the success of an IO strategy, but in today’s world you need a single communication platform that speaks to each audience simultaneously. In this way, every communication, from the high-level ten second pitch (the sound byte-level rationale for war, for instance) to the ground-level detailed conversations (discussions between a battalion commander and a local leader) must be in complete synchronization. As with leading global brands, the US needs to think in terms of the tagline, the elevator pitch, messaging, market segmentation, customer profiles, direct marketing, guerilla marketing, viral marketing, and partnering.

But broadening the US concept of IO requires more. It’s not just about transforming the US into the most beloved brand on planet Earth. America’s enemies aren’t fighting for narrow political or economic interests. They are motivated by broad ideological and religious imperatives. In his recent letter to President Bush, the President of Iran, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, made it clear that liberalism and Western-style democracy “have not been able to help realize the ideals of humanity.” This echoes Sayyid Qutb, the intellectual father of Islamic fundamentalism, who has written, “Western civilization has nothing else to give humanity....The dominance of Western man has reached its end. The time has come for Islam to take the lead.” And these thoughts reverberate in coffee houses around the Muslim world and virtual communities on Orkut that unequivocally support bin Laden and insurgent actions in Iraq.

Insurgents engage coalition forces in combat, but untold numbers are fighting against the concept of modern western civilization. The United States and her allies are fighting a determined enemy that can be beaten, but not broken by current means at the military’s disposal. Given the typical length of time required to defeat an enemy in an asymmetric conflict, endurance is critical to achieving victory. Current and future enemies will all have a long-term strategy. They will think and plan in terms of decades and centuries, not months and years. In order to receive the resources the military needs – in terms of materials, manpower, and authority – Western civilian populations must understand that this struggle poses an existential threat.

Israel, which has endured steady conflict with its neighbors since its independence in 1948, demonstrates the value of achieving a tight integration between the civilian population and military community. Certainly, this integration benefits from mandatory conscription and yearly reserve duty of men from all sectors of society. But this sense of shared purpose has been seriously tested over the last seventeen years (since the onset of the first Intifada). Despite the deep division within the country regarding Israeli military and political control over the West Bank and Gaza, motivation for service in combat units and reserve duty participation remains high.

The country continues to produce successive generations of youth who are eager to join frontline units – thereby making entrance to the best units as competitive as gaining acceptance to the best universities in the West – and the country maintains an extraordinary large (given the size of the general population) reserve force. Even during the most heightened period of political discord, this did not change. In fact, levels of participation and motivation have only continued to grow. In part, this is because Israelis widely believe that they are under an existential threat from their Arab neighbors. Therefore, even if a majority of the population disagrees with the policies and military tactics employed in the West Bank and Gaza, there still remains widespread agreement that the Israeli military needs to maintain its competitive edge against its potential enemies. And as a result, even those people who disapprove of government policies encourage their sons and daughters to participate in the military. Moreover, even people who disapprove of government policies, continue to train and serve with their reserve units.

Simultaneously creating and leveraging an Israeli civilian culture that is tightly integrated with the Israeli military culture, the Israeli military takes pains to establish a direct connection between a soldier’s training and nearly four thousand years of Jewish history. As a result, Israeli soldiers don’t just see themselves as protectors of the modern country of Israel, they see themselves as filling an essential role that has kept the Jewish people safe for thousands of years. When Israeli soldiers shout “never again” during their swearing in ceremony, they are harking back to the defenders of Masada in 72 CE, remembering the Warsaw ghetto uprising, and know that the future of the Jewish people, wherever they are in the world, depend on their vigilance and determination.

Israeli commanders and soldiers do not perceive themselves as merely serving narrow political and economic interests or as simply performing tasks that increase the country’s security. Soldiers are conscious of the real-politic rationale and the real-world effect of their actions, but at the same time they are made to understand that every action they take directly impacts the future of their nation. For instance, failure to capture a terrorist doesn’t just possibly lead to the death of fellow citizens; it may also cause peace negotiations to end. Or the inadvertent killing of a Palestinian civilian through negligence could spark riots that create a spiraling chain of events that leads to war. Causing soldiers to understand that every action they take has the potential for catastrophic consequences eliminates the possibility of failure as an option.

Israel has long recognized the value of integrating its IO and PA. Of course, that does not mean that Israel has distinguished itself as consistently providing an effective IO strategy. That said, the Israeli IO strategy that took shape during Operation Defensive Shield in 2002 demonstrates the impact of an effective strategy.

Prior to this period, the Israeli IO strategy resulted in a politically divided country, increased hatred of Israelis by Palestinians, extensive political pressure being placed on Israel by the US and other Western nations that severely limited the military’s freedom of action. Here is the summation of the Israeli IO between 1989 and 2002.

These lands were thrust on us by war. This is our ancestral land and we have as much right as anyone to settle it. We are willing to negotiate land for peace, but we have no credible partner. When we have a partner, we’ll give up control of the land. Until then, we will administer these territories in a way that is just and humane.

The failure of the Israeli IO during this period is demonstrated by the lack of acknowledgement on the part of Israelis, Palestinians, or the international community regarding the fact that the lives of the Palestinian people had been improved dramatically by Israeli administration of the West Bank and Gaza.

Israel established six universities and empowered these institutions to select their own curriculum – thus making them some of the freest in the Middle East. In addition, Israel permitted a free and open press as well as the election of mayors in major cities decades before the Oslo Accords. In addition, the Palestinian economy grew rapidly and health conditions improved dramatically.

Even when Israel let PLO leaders return, allowed them to establish the Palestinian Authority, and relinquished administrative and military control over most of the West Bank and Gaza as part of the Oslo Accords in 1993, the Israeli military and intelligence community was under tremendous internal and external pressure to restrain its activities. This occurred despite a sharp rise in terrorism that led to heavy civilian losses in Israel. Interestingly, the Palestinian political leadership and paramilitary forces retained freedom of movement and action throughout this period.

The tangible and measurable improvements to the standard of living and quality of life in the West Bank and Gaza were mostly ignored by the Palestinian population and the world community. And while the failure on the part of the Palestinian leadership to meet its obligations was met with understanding in Israel and the world, Israel remained under tremendous pressure to accede to Palestinian political aspirations.

In this way, the failure of the Israeli IO strategy between 1989 and 2002 directly impacted the way in which the conflict unfolded and limited Israel’s freedom of action. In fact, for more than twenty years, Israel attempted – at various stages and in different ways – to win the “hearts and minds” of the Palestinian population. Every attempt failed to bridge political gaps or reduce the level of violence on the ground. In fact, violence increased as the Palestinians approached their political goals.

This all changed when the Israeli government adopted a new IO strategy prior to the launching of Operation Defensive Shield. A central component of the Israeli strategy was the development of a central narrative that galvanized Israeli public support for security policies, ensured freedom of action by mitigating international pressure, and demoralized the enemy. The Israeli IO strategy communicated the following:

The Palestinians have rejected a fair offer of peace. Since then, Israeli citizens have been bombarded by murderous attacks. For nearly ten years, Israel has restrained itself, but now it has reached a point where it must protect its citizens.

The primary difference between the old and new IO strategy is that Israel developed a clear message that focused on its universally accepted right to protect its citizens. This message was not complicated by an assertion of territorial rights over the West Bank and Gaza. The IO made it clear that Israeli actions were being taken only to protect the lives of its civilian population.

For the Israeli military, the IO strategy was essential the successful launching of Operation Defensive Shield. As a result, the emergency call-up of reserves (the largest call-up since the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982) was met with overwhelming public support. In fact, the Israeli military had large numbers of people, who were not obligated to serve, coming to induction centers around the country in order to volunteer. Not only did the IO strategy establish internal cohesion, but it also mitigated external pressure. Prior to this period, a large-scale deployment of the Israeli military in the West Bank and Gaza was not feasible. Moreover, the success of Operation Defensive Shield has enabled the Israeli military and intelligence community complete freedom of action. As a result, Israel is able to conduct counter-insurgency operations continuously without concern for international or domestic pressure to pull back.

Certainly, the successful implementation of the tactics in the field was crucial to the success of the strategy. If, as had been feared at the operation’s outset, that thousands of Israeli soldiers would be killed or wounded during the re-occupation of the West Bank and Gaza, Israeli public support may have evaporated. As a strategic tool, IO can shape the battlefield – the number and type of soldiers a military can field, freedom of action, and the number and type of combatants a military will face – and help ensure that the aftermath leads to victory, but soldiers still need to defeat the enemy they face. As always, the fate of war depends on the actions taken by individual soldiers on the ground.

Given the freedom of action they needed, the Israeli military and intelligence community have reduced the number of successful Palestinian attacks by 90%, decreased the number of citizens killed by 70%, and lowered the number of wounded by 85% in the same time period.

In addition, a poll conducted by Beirzeit University in October 2005, after the completion of the Israeli disengagement plan, shows a significant reduction in Gaza of Palestinian support for groups that commit terrorist acts. Also, according to the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR), Palestinian attitudes regarding violence, especially suicide attacks, have dropped sharply to its lowest level in seven years. Support for suicide attacks have dropped from 77% in 2004 to 29% in 2005.

Currently, Israel continues to evolve the IO strategy in such a way as to create a political and military advantage over the Palestinians. The recent disengagement from Gaza serves to undercut the main element of the story of occupation that Palestinians rely on for political leverage. By disengaging from Gaza, Israel takes a first step toward changing the way it is understood by its own citizens and the world.

The success of the new political party in Israel, Kadima, whose platform commits its members to take actions that fulfill the vision promoted by the Israeli IO strategy, demonstrates the enduring nature of a successful IO strategy. And today, four years after its re-occupation of the West Bank and Gaza, the Israeli military conducts counter-terrorism operations in Gaza and frames them as purely defensive without concern for external or internal pressure.

The Israeli IO strategy is not comprehensive enough to serve as a template for the US, but the elements that promote internal cohesion and deeper integration between the civilian population and the military community may serve as a basis for discussion. For instance:

• The US military must be perceived as being more than a force employed by political, security, and economic drivers to safeguard the prosperity of the American people and ensure their defense.

• The members of the US military, at all levels, must see themselves primarily as playing a vital role in the wider narrative of democracy and freedom. US soldiers and civilians must come to view today’s military as the guarantors of peace, prosperity, and liberty that didn’t just start with the minutemen, but harks all the way back to the small Greek navy that defeated the Persian armada at Salamis.

• The missions soldiers are asked to undertake and their behavior at all times must be aligned with the wider national culture in order to heighten the sense of duty, increase the motivation to succeed, and further integrate the military with the civilian population.

• An IO strategy must be based on an unassailable universal ideal or a clearly defined and immediate existential threat that can not be refuted or subverted.

• An IO strategy must also take into account the fact it will be appropriated and contextualized over time. For this reason, the narrative constructed must be acceptable and meaningful to citizens at home, soldiers in the field, allies abroad, and the indigenous population which we aim to protect or support.

In addition, US planners must move past the assumption that greater economic, political, religious, and cultural freedom will lead an indigenous population to embrace our presence, adopt our worldview, and reduce friction between competing groups in the region.

Beyond the example of the Palestinian reaction to the economic and political benefits they gained from the Oslo Peace Process, the Iraqi reaction to US presence in Iraq serves as another example of the limitations of a strategy that is based on “winning hearts and minds.”

Even though the United States and her allies have freed the Iraqi people from the rule of a brutal dictator and despite the billions of dollars in US treasure spent, the more than two thousand US lives lost, and over fifteen thousand US soldiers wounded on their behalf, the United States is still perceived by our closest allies in Iraq as a benevolent occupier.

The US sees itself as a liberator and hopes to win “hearts and minds” through every day interactions between US representatives – both civilian and military – as well as good works carried out by NGOs, USAID, and the US military. Unfortunately, after three years, the insurgency has become increasingly sophisticated and the number of enemy combatants has grown. In fact, during the recent elections, even our supporters took part in a joint statement of all Iraqi factions that specifically cited that attacks against US soldiers was permissible.

The US has improved the lives of millions, but a single image transmitted by Aljazeera that reflects Arab preconceptions regarding US immorality or suspicions regarding US motivations can undermine efforts to establish a shared vision of the future, increase our enemy’s rate of recruitment, and damage US civilian support for the military.

Even prior to the march to Baghdad, the US placed a great deal of value on democratization, legitimization of pro-US Iraqi political leaders, massive reconstruction projects that were meant to improve the lives of the average Iraqi citizen, and ROEs that were designed to minimize civilian casualties.

Unfortunately, the Iraqi people perceive the US as an occupier despite the positive impact the US has had on their lives. A recent assessment by Ken Pollack at the Brookings Institute suggests that political progress will not decrease insurgent motivation. He believes that the US military will need to confront a growing insurgency for many years to come if the US remains committed to the idea of creating a stable, democratic Iraq.

Also, John Lynn, writing for the Small Wars Center for Excellence published in Military Review, that the US can not win the hearts and minds of the Iraqis. Lynn suggests that the US can only provide security and work to establish trust.

Many factors have contributed to the Iraqi people’s reaction to the US presence. Certainly the years of anti-US propaganda to which Iraqi citizens have been bombarded for decades through local and regional media contributed to the Iraqi people’s response.

For this reason, US planners must develop a comprehensive and flexible IO strategy that adopts the best practices of leading global brands, evolves throughout the life of our presence within an area of operation, and takes into account the policies of democratic countries that have enabled integration between their military and civilian populations.