3 Myths That Hindered Israeli Success
As a writer, I admire the power of myth and recognize the important role it plays in culture. But as an Israeli citizen and reserve soldier who may be called to fight, it is disturbing to see how myth-making influences policymakers.
It is relatively easy to forgive the media for its role in distributing propaganda and making quick-draw assessments. After all, news organizations, in order to survive, need provocative content to increase audience size and boost advertising revenue.
Likewise, you can’t fault Arab leaders and their apologists for making false assertions that deflect blame, deny responsibility, and assert false victory. Arab leaders aren’t interested in self-criticism – totalitarian regimes never are – and their apologists would much rather blame European colonization, Israel’s existence, and American policy for all their woes. It’s far easier to blame others than to take responsibility for the sectarian violence, abject poverty, intolerance, militancy, radicalism, and abuse of women.
By comparison, Israelis are intensely self-critical. This approach drives innovation and opens the way for change, but it also keeps the country’s leaders – and therefore Israel’s allies and enemies alike – from recognizing important truths. Leaders are supposed to be able to differentiate between critical and irrelevant information when making decisions. Unfortunately, the Israeli political and military leadership failed their country and Western democracies because they gave credence to three myths that have gained status akin to fact because they have been widely circulated and often repeated by the media.
As a result, leaders have chosen a path that does not increase Israeli security or enhance regional stability. A critical mistake has been made, but it can be corrected. If it isn’t, the position of Islamic fascists will be greatly enhanced in the Middle East and around the world.
Israeli leaders acted as if they believed these three myths:
1. Operation Peace for the Galilee was a disaster for Israel. Throughout the 70’s, Israel was shelled and attacked by a powerful militia – the PLO – which was based in Lebanon after a failed attempt to overthrow the Jordanian government. In 1982, the Israeli government called up its reserves and used its full force against the PLO. Arafat was literally shipped to Tunis. Israeli cities in the north became safe. The invasion proved that a terrorist infrastructure can be dismantled if overwhelming force is employed. But public perception of success changed as the mission itself and the challenges faced evolved after the Israeli military established a security zone in Southern Lebanon. Israeli leaders today failed to distinguish between the results of the military offensive and the challenges faced by long-term occupation. The fact that Israeli Defense Minister Amir Peretz was a former leader in the Peace Now movement that advocated Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon may have influenced his inability to differentiate between the two, but he was not alone. Especially given the success of Operation Defensive Shield in 2002 – where the military also estimated that thousands of Israeli soldiers may die – it is unfortunate that Israeli leaders did not have the wisdom to understand that sustaining losses was critical to achieving a vital strategic goal. As usual, the Israeli civilian population was well ahead of its leaders. They demonstrated willingness to endure Hezbollah’s missiles for as long was necessary for the military to achieve its mission. Unfortunately, the Israeli government was too cautious and unwilling to take the necessary risks that ultimately would have led to success.
2. Israel withdrew from Lebanon in 2000 because of Hezbollah. As a guerilla organization, Hezbollah engagements against Israel were negligible until 1991. They weren’t even the most powerful Shia militia, until – thanks to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard – they overcame the more secular Amal. In 1991, their use of anti-tank missiles and roadside bombs led to an increase in Israeli casualties. Initially, the IDF fielded more forces in Lebanon to limit Hezbollah’s ability to conduct missions. As a result, the number of Israeli soldiers killed and wounded decreased dramatically. In 1995, the IDF fielded a new unit, called Egoz, which focused exclusively on anti-guerilla tactics. Egoz put Hezbollah on the defensive and the perceived threat from Lebanon was diminished. The success of Egoz influenced Israel’s decision to withdraw, but the decision was mainly the result of revitalized efforts to reach negotiated settlements with its neighbors. Israel signed a peace treaty with Jordan in 1994 and the Oslo Peace Process seemed on the verge of success when Israel removed its troops from Lebanon in May 2000. As expected, Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon was celebrated as if it were a victory for Hezbollah, when it really was a testament to the fact that they longer posed a significant threat. This may be another myth, but it has been said that the belief that Israel was defeated in Lebanon brought about the second Intifadah and Palestinian rejection of the settlement reached at Camp David several months later. Especially when the people of the Middle East are manipulated by government incitement to hatred as a method for deflecting internal dissent, Israeli military actions must always gain a clear victory that no amount of propaganda can reduce to failure. If Israel allows itself – out of its own tendency for self-criticism – to act tentatively and remain fearful of how it is perceived by an international community that does not have its best interests at heart, Israel will fail to secure its future and will have no one to blame but itself.
3. Ceasefires lead to peaceful conflict resolution. UN sponsored ceasefires rarely lead to conflict resolution, but negotiated settlements between two sovereign nations do. This is especially true with Lebanon because the country has been fractured and relatively decentralized since the start of its civil war in 1975. Even prior to the civil war, the Lebanese people did not completely control their own destiny. Since the PLO was the strongest militia in Lebanon, UN resolution 425 in 1978 didn’t stop the PLO from shelling Israeli towns. And after Israel sent the PLO packing, the Syrians and Iranians took control. That’s why the ceasefires in 1993, 1996, 2002, 2003, and 2005 did not create change. And that’s why it isn’t surprising that this year’s resolution, 1701, has already become neutered of meaning by the Lebanese Prime Minister, who has reneged on the most important element of the agreement, and the international community, which has significantly lowered the number of soldiers it will field and weakened the UNIFIL’s mandate. The resolution states that Southern Lebanon must be “free of any armed personnel, assets and weapons other than those of the government of Lebanon and UNIFIL,” but Hezbollah will now retain its arms in Southern Lebanon. Furthermore, not only will the Lebanese Army and UNIFIL refrain from destroying existing weapons caches, they won’t keep new weapons from entering Lebanon. UNIFIL will become larger, but it won’t become more effective or enable Lebanon to become the thriving, free, and democratic country its people asked for during the Cedar Revolution in 2005. Recent events in Southern Lebanon will be celebrated by Islamic fascists as if they had stormed the beaches of Normandy. And if the western world – whether through a strong Israeli military response or an international force – fails to demonstrate that it has the desire and ability to fully implement UN resolutions 1559 and 1701, it will be taken as yet another sign that secular, liberal democracies do not have what it takes to fight and defeat Islamic fascism. Islamic radicals around the world are watching and their next step will be a direct response to our future actions or inaction.
As a writer, I admire the power of myth and recognize the important role it plays in culture. But as an Israeli citizen and reserve soldier who may be called to fight, it is disturbing to see how myth-making influences policymakers.
It is relatively easy to forgive the media for its role in distributing propaganda and making quick-draw assessments. After all, news organizations, in order to survive, need provocative content to increase audience size and boost advertising revenue.
Likewise, you can’t fault Arab leaders and their apologists for making false assertions that deflect blame, deny responsibility, and assert false victory. Arab leaders aren’t interested in self-criticism – totalitarian regimes never are – and their apologists would much rather blame European colonization, Israel’s existence, and American policy for all their woes. It’s far easier to blame others than to take responsibility for the sectarian violence, abject poverty, intolerance, militancy, radicalism, and abuse of women.
By comparison, Israelis are intensely self-critical. This approach drives innovation and opens the way for change, but it also keeps the country’s leaders – and therefore Israel’s allies and enemies alike – from recognizing important truths. Leaders are supposed to be able to differentiate between critical and irrelevant information when making decisions. Unfortunately, the Israeli political and military leadership failed their country and Western democracies because they gave credence to three myths that have gained status akin to fact because they have been widely circulated and often repeated by the media.
As a result, leaders have chosen a path that does not increase Israeli security or enhance regional stability. A critical mistake has been made, but it can be corrected. If it isn’t, the position of Islamic fascists will be greatly enhanced in the Middle East and around the world.
Israeli leaders acted as if they believed these three myths:
1. Operation Peace for the Galilee was a disaster for Israel. Throughout the 70’s, Israel was shelled and attacked by a powerful militia – the PLO – which was based in Lebanon after a failed attempt to overthrow the Jordanian government. In 1982, the Israeli government called up its reserves and used its full force against the PLO. Arafat was literally shipped to Tunis. Israeli cities in the north became safe. The invasion proved that a terrorist infrastructure can be dismantled if overwhelming force is employed. But public perception of success changed as the mission itself and the challenges faced evolved after the Israeli military established a security zone in Southern Lebanon. Israeli leaders today failed to distinguish between the results of the military offensive and the challenges faced by long-term occupation. The fact that Israeli Defense Minister Amir Peretz was a former leader in the Peace Now movement that advocated Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon may have influenced his inability to differentiate between the two, but he was not alone. Especially given the success of Operation Defensive Shield in 2002 – where the military also estimated that thousands of Israeli soldiers may die – it is unfortunate that Israeli leaders did not have the wisdom to understand that sustaining losses was critical to achieving a vital strategic goal. As usual, the Israeli civilian population was well ahead of its leaders. They demonstrated willingness to endure Hezbollah’s missiles for as long was necessary for the military to achieve its mission. Unfortunately, the Israeli government was too cautious and unwilling to take the necessary risks that ultimately would have led to success.
2. Israel withdrew from Lebanon in 2000 because of Hezbollah. As a guerilla organization, Hezbollah engagements against Israel were negligible until 1991. They weren’t even the most powerful Shia militia, until – thanks to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard – they overcame the more secular Amal. In 1991, their use of anti-tank missiles and roadside bombs led to an increase in Israeli casualties. Initially, the IDF fielded more forces in Lebanon to limit Hezbollah’s ability to conduct missions. As a result, the number of Israeli soldiers killed and wounded decreased dramatically. In 1995, the IDF fielded a new unit, called Egoz, which focused exclusively on anti-guerilla tactics. Egoz put Hezbollah on the defensive and the perceived threat from Lebanon was diminished. The success of Egoz influenced Israel’s decision to withdraw, but the decision was mainly the result of revitalized efforts to reach negotiated settlements with its neighbors. Israel signed a peace treaty with Jordan in 1994 and the Oslo Peace Process seemed on the verge of success when Israel removed its troops from Lebanon in May 2000. As expected, Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon was celebrated as if it were a victory for Hezbollah, when it really was a testament to the fact that they longer posed a significant threat. This may be another myth, but it has been said that the belief that Israel was defeated in Lebanon brought about the second Intifadah and Palestinian rejection of the settlement reached at Camp David several months later. Especially when the people of the Middle East are manipulated by government incitement to hatred as a method for deflecting internal dissent, Israeli military actions must always gain a clear victory that no amount of propaganda can reduce to failure. If Israel allows itself – out of its own tendency for self-criticism – to act tentatively and remain fearful of how it is perceived by an international community that does not have its best interests at heart, Israel will fail to secure its future and will have no one to blame but itself.
3. Ceasefires lead to peaceful conflict resolution. UN sponsored ceasefires rarely lead to conflict resolution, but negotiated settlements between two sovereign nations do. This is especially true with Lebanon because the country has been fractured and relatively decentralized since the start of its civil war in 1975. Even prior to the civil war, the Lebanese people did not completely control their own destiny. Since the PLO was the strongest militia in Lebanon, UN resolution 425 in 1978 didn’t stop the PLO from shelling Israeli towns. And after Israel sent the PLO packing, the Syrians and Iranians took control. That’s why the ceasefires in 1993, 1996, 2002, 2003, and 2005 did not create change. And that’s why it isn’t surprising that this year’s resolution, 1701, has already become neutered of meaning by the Lebanese Prime Minister, who has reneged on the most important element of the agreement, and the international community, which has significantly lowered the number of soldiers it will field and weakened the UNIFIL’s mandate. The resolution states that Southern Lebanon must be “free of any armed personnel, assets and weapons other than those of the government of Lebanon and UNIFIL,” but Hezbollah will now retain its arms in Southern Lebanon. Furthermore, not only will the Lebanese Army and UNIFIL refrain from destroying existing weapons caches, they won’t keep new weapons from entering Lebanon. UNIFIL will become larger, but it won’t become more effective or enable Lebanon to become the thriving, free, and democratic country its people asked for during the Cedar Revolution in 2005. Recent events in Southern Lebanon will be celebrated by Islamic fascists as if they had stormed the beaches of Normandy. And if the western world – whether through a strong Israeli military response or an international force – fails to demonstrate that it has the desire and ability to fully implement UN resolutions 1559 and 1701, it will be taken as yet another sign that secular, liberal democracies do not have what it takes to fight and defeat Islamic fascism. Islamic radicals around the world are watching and their next step will be a direct response to our future actions or inaction.
posted by Adam Harmon at
9:34 PM
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