Why Israel Will Strike Iran

I’ll save you the suspense. Israel is going to attack Iran’s nuclear facilities in three months.

Of late, many have been discussing the virtues, challenges, risks, and potential consequences of an Israeli strike on Iran. Depending who you ask, a preemptive attack is an absolute necessity, the lesser of two evils, unwise, or reckless.

Unfortunately, no well-informed and intellectually honest individual could say that they know
the right course of action. There are rational arguments on all sides of this debate, but I’m not going to discuss why I think Israel should or shouldn’t attack. I’m going to tell you why they will attack. It’s already a done deal.

First, Israeli leaders believe that a nuclear Iran poses an existential threat to Israel and the Israeli public agrees. 90% think Iran is building nuclear weapons and 43% of the country support a military strike. Israeli leaders genuinely believe that they have a responsibility to keep the Jewish people safe and take a threat of this magnitude very seriously. The phrase “Never Again” isn’t just rhetoric and Israeli leaders aren’t just posturing when they say that a nuclear Iran is unacceptable.

Second, Israeli leaders know that world powers will not stop Iran. Israeli warnings have been ignored for nearly a decade. The sanctions being imposed today may have had an impact, if they had been instituted when Israel first sounded the alarm. For Israelis, it’s too little too late. By time sanctions take full effect in July, the Iranian nuclear program will be so deep underground that even the world’s most powerful munitions may not be able to reach it. The Israelis know that the US is not going to attack Iran. The US fears an increase in Iranian-sponsored attacks on US forces in the Middle East more than they fear a nuclear armed Iran. Israel knows that it is on its own and its people are OK with that.

Third, Israeli citizens are willing and able to face the repercussions of an attack on Iran. The Israeli public has demonstrated tremendous resiliency in the face of daily missile and terror attacks. Even though Israelis rightly expect that thousands of missiles will be launched from Lebanon and Gaza, Hezbollah and Hamas might not attack. Hezbollah and Hamas know they will pay a heavy political price for instigating devastation on Lebanon and Gaza just to please Iran. Both terror organizations have restrained themselves over the last five years because they each lost power and influence after the last time they picked a fight with Israel. They know another attack on Israel will further diminish their power at home. In any event, Israeli leaders aren’t letting concerns about a Hezbollah and Hamas retaliation impact their decision because they know the Israeli public will endure the repercussions of a strike on Iran.

Fourth, Israelis like proving that every challenge can be overcome. As with Iran today, many experts believed that Israel could not destroy the Iraqi Osirak nuclear plant. It was deemed too far and complicated given the distance and Israel’s resources. Israel gleefully proved them wrong. Syria used one of the world’s most sophisticated anti-aircraft systems to protect its secret nuclear facility. In 2007, Israel essentially found the defense system’s off switch and destroyed the facility in minutes. Iranian facilities are highly distributed and much better protected than anything the Israeli military has encountered before, but Israeli planners will come up with an innovative solution to the problem. They always do. Only time will tell if it works, but Israeli leaders will believe that success is possible and that will give them the confidence needed to authorize IDF commanders to strike.

Fifth, Israeli security depends on a strong deterrence. Israel makes the price of attacking it so high that its enemies think twice before attacking again. This deterrence is the reason why Arab nations stopped conducting all-out wars with Israel. In 1973, when Israel overcame the surprise attack and decimated the Arab armies, the Arab nations finally understood that attacking Israel was a pointless exercise. This is why Sadat came to Israel and signed a peace agreement. Hamas and Hezbollah have been restraining themselves since their last fight with Israel. A successful attack on Iran – especially if it also includes effective operations against Hezbollah and Hamas – will significantly strengthen Israeli deterrence. Israeli leaders also recognize that they have been talking about the Iranian threat and Israel’s readiness to preemptively strike for years. If Israel does nothing and Iran builds a nuclear weapon, Israel will appear weak in a neighborhood where weakness is a cardinal sin. Israeli leaders know inaction will lead to a surge in attacks from the West Bank, Gaza, Lebanon and perhaps even Egypt and Jordan.

Israelis see the Iranian nuclear program as an existential threat, they know that the world community will not stop the Iranians, they believe they have a way to accomplish the mission, see themselves as being prepared for the backlash, and predict that the price of failing to act is much higher than the price of taking action. For these reasons, Israel will attack the Iranian nuclear facilities.

Given the timelines leaked to the media, it looks like Israel will strike in the next three months. To those Israeli soldiers who are participating in the operation, I wish god’s speed, good luck, and a safe return home. For those Israeli citizens who will likely bear the brunt of the storm that follows, make room for one more – unless, of course, I can be of use by donning a uniform again.

Harnessing The Arab Spring To Solve The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

Israeli and Palestinian leaders have been negotiating for seventeen years, but they are no closer to a peace agreement today than they were on May 4th, 1994 when Israel let the PLO set up a proto-state in the West Bank and Gaza.

Israeli and Palestinian leaders have tried direct negotiations, US-led negotiations, and multinational negotiations that have included the US, EU, Russia, and the UN. The Palestinians and Israelis have both tried the use of force. They have both taken unilateral steps.

The failure of these approaches has been inevitable because the Palestinians don’t feel like the magnitude of their experience or the scope of their aspirations is being fully addressed.

At the same time, Israelis have good reason to believe that the Palestinians are still not ready to accept the legitimacy of Israel as the rightful homeland of the Jewish people. Despite this concern, the Israeli people and the last five Israeli Prime Ministers, including Benjamin Netanyahu, have all been ready to make a deal.

Israeli leaders have put forth a number of plans that essentially give Palestinians full control and statehood over 97% of the West Bank. Israel has asked for the 3%, where the vast majority of Israeli settlements can be found. In exchange, Israel gives the Palestinians 3% of undisputed Israeli territory to physically connect the West Bank and Gaza into a unified state. Even on Jerusalem, successive Israeli governments have shown willingness to draw the border between Israel and Palestine in ways that would enable both sides to claim Jerusalem as their capital.

When Israelis ask themselves why Palestinian leaders refuse to accept negotiated terms that seem reasonable to them, the EU, and the US, they typically assume that the Palestinian simply don't want genuine peace with Israel. I’ve certainly thought that and it very well may be true. The continuous Palestinian state-sponsored incitement against Jews and their leadership’s official celebration of individuals who murder children makes it hard to argue that they seek peace.

Even so, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict isn’t going to solve itself or become easier to manage by trying to wait it out. Part of the problem is that Israel has never been – and never will be – in a position to fully satisfy the needs of the Palestinian people. The West Bank and Gaza really isn’t enough. They need and deserve Amman too.

While the world celebrates the fall of Arab dictators like Mubarak and Gaddafi, world leaders sit down for lunch with Jordanian King Abdullah II. Abdullah II is much more congenial than Bashar Assad, the Syrian dictator who has hired Iranian and Hezbollah thugs to kill civilians, but the two have a lot in common. They both rely on security services to remain in power and lead a small minority tribe that rules over a majority.In Syria, the Allawi tribe is 10% of the total population. In Jordan, the Bedouin tribe is 20% of the total population. 80% of Jordanians self-identify as Palestinian.

This comes as no surprise given that Churchill “created Jordan with the stroke of a pen one Sunday afternoon” in 1921 to reward Abdullah Hussein for his support during World War I. The British made him King and the Bedouin minority have been ruling over the Palestinian majority ever since.

The Palestinians call the war waged against Israel’s existence in 1948 “The Catastrophe,” but the greatest blow to their national aspirations actually occurred in 1921 when Britain gave away 70% of their land to Abdullah. Today, there are more Palestinians living in Jordan than in the West Bank.

No one wants to pressure Jordan’s King Abdullah II to abdicate. Other Arab dictators believe it will accelerate their own departure from power. U.S. and European leaders don’t want to dismantle a relatively stable and friendly Arab nation, especially during a particularly tumultuous period in the Middle East. Of course, the same could have been said about Mubarak before the US government decided to take away some of his few remaining lifelines.

From the Israeli perspective, the Jordanian monarchy has been relatively non-belligerent for decades and they don’t want to rock the boat. Palestinians remain publically quiet regarding their historic claims to Jordan. In time, we’ll see the extent by which they are biding their time until the conflict with Israel is resolved.

The Jordanian monarchy will eventually fall. The Arab Spring revolutions in Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, and Syria demonstrate that it’s inevitable, especially given the Jordanian lack of legitimacy and its lack of the economic resources needed to hold onto power. The Saudis can buy their people’s love. The Jordanians can barely afford to buy their people a stick of gum. It is just a question of time.

Regional and world powers must decide whether they want to proactively enable an orderly transition in Jordan that has a positive impact on the region or face the chaos, risk, and uncertainty that will result from the inevitable overthrow of the Jordanian monarchy.

Including Jordan as part of the final settlement with Israel won’t replace the need for Israeli-Palestinian negotiations over core issues like Jerusalem, the West Bank, Gaza, and the Palestinian diaspora. Extreme right wing elements in Israel have talked about transferring Palestinians to Jordan. No Israeli leader has endorsed this concept and a vast majority of Israelis reject this approach out of hand.

I am not suggesting deportations or population transfers. I am suggesting that the Palestinians be given full authority over both the West and East Bank (Jordan) as well as Gaza. The Palestinians still get the vast majority of the West Bank and Gaza as envisioned in prior negotiations with Israel. They just also get Jordan too.

Widening the vision of peace to include Palestinian sovereignty over Jordan is the best way to narrow the gap between what the Palestinians want and what they will receive. It won’t diminish the desire of many Palestinians to return to villages left in 1948, but the sheer size and potential of a Palestinian state that is nearly five times the size of Israel should enable the vast majority of Palestinians to feel like they are receiving a fair deal.

World leaders have pressured Mubarak, Gaddafi, and Assad to abdicate power without having a clear understanding of the day-after impact on Egypt, Libya, Syria, and the region as a whole. In the instance of Jordan, the impact on the region is clear, controllable, and transformative.

Abdullah II recently said he’d step down if he experienced the kind of resistance Bashar Assad currently faces in Syria. He has opened the door for the kind of discussion that needs to take place between world leaders and Jordan.

If world leaders actually believe that solving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is critical to achieving stability in the region and think that it will reduce the rationale for global Islamic terrorism, then they must pressure King Abdullah II to abdicate power in Jordan and enable a handoff of sovereignty to the Palestinians as part of a comprehensive peace deal with Israel.

It will increase the viability of a Palestinian state and help end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The sooner that happens, the better life will be for Palestinians, Israelis, the Middle East, and the world.

Living in a Democracy. Working in an Autocracy.

I recently took part in a planning session at work. The team had been debating competing approaches for nearly twenty minutes when a member of our executive team expressed his preferred tactic. Discussion ended instantly. The team aligned itself with the executive as if his opinion meant more than any other – and outweighed all others combined.

I work for a large global high tech company, but this dyanmic – where subordinates reflexively defer to the judgement of managers – is the norm at American organizations of all sizes and across all industries.

Despite the common misconception, smaller organizations aren’t more progressive or agile than larger ones just because they have fewer layers of bureacracy. In fact, they are often more hierarchical than their larger competitors. Whether your organization has 100,000 employees or 10, there’s a 100% chance that your organization is essentially autocratic and feudal.

Between American political correctness and a US culture that encourages acquiescence to superiors, it is hard for people to openly contradict colleagues, scrutinize managers, and give equal weight to opinions expressed by those at the lowest level of authority. This dynamic leads to avoidable missteps, missed opportunities, stifles debate, discourages innovation, limits options considered, and inhibits the ability of an organization to make vital course corrections rapidly.

A strong hierarchy benefits an organization in the short-term, but most research suggests that long-term success depends on decentralized decision-making.

As Americans, we are proud to live in a country where everyone – irrespective of socio-economic standing – is equal under the law and where the majority rules. But we abdicate these principles and rights the moment we enter the workplace. To achieve the level of business agility, operational excellence and long-term competitiveness that ambitious organizations seek, personnel at all levels of the organization need to have an equal voice in decision-making.

Given our culture, it may seem like a waste of time and a little bit dangerous to give a new employee with 1 year of professional experience the opportunity to critique and re-shape a CEO’s 5-year plan, but this is the kind of dramatic change in corporate culture that is required to achieve business agility and be competitive in the 21st century.

I am not calling for a corporate Tea Party, promoting mob rule, suggesting we elect CEO’s by popular vote, or believe we should abandon modern corporate organizational structures that have served us well for decades.

But a new approach is needed. For over a decade, there have been efforts to transform traditional organizations – that are based on 19th century thinking and 20th century management systems – into learning organizations and high performance cultures. Despite the substantial amount of resources invested and executive sponsorship, progress has been limited to incremental improvements in niche areas like decision-making, accountability, innovation, or leadership development.

Leading experts have been unable to fully realize and implement their vision of high performance. To a large extent, this is because they lack a real world example of a large organization that epitomizes the characteristics of a learning organization and a mature high performance culture.

As a result, corporations, government agencies, and the military are left without clear guidance on best practice approaches or a proven method for transforming organizations into high performance cultures.

One organization does epitomize the character traits and organizational behaviors of a learning organization and mature high performance culture, but it isn’t a corporation and it isn’t based in the US. It is a well-known foreign organization that has successfully employed this model for over 60 years – the Israel Defense Forces (IDF).

Although counter-intuitive, the IDF is more agile and less formal than a Silicon Valley start-up. A private and a general are on a first-name basis. The IDF systematically and continuously empowers a private to impact the organization’s strategy and tactics. And as is well-known, the IDF has demonstrated an uncanny ability to consistently adapt quickly, learn from mistakes, and defeat emerging threats.

The IDF has a traditional hierarchical structure – that is responsible for creating strategy, setting priorities, managing processes, ensuring unity of effort, running operations, and overseeing growth. At the same time, the IDF has a parallel bottom-to-top framework that has equal influence over all decision-making.

Generals can’t adopt new strategies without the endorsement of the privates who will be implementing those policies in the field. Privates and Sergeants are also duty-bound to critique the strategies and tactics that are championed by their superiors. Most briefing sessions – where senior leaders explain their plan to subordinates –lead to changes in strategy, tactics, and even force structure due to questions and suggestions by soldiers of the lowest rank. Privates, who are on a first name basis with Generals, are trained to think critically and encouraged to constantly scrutinize their leaders.

The relatively seamless integration between these two decision-making frameworks – one that is top-to-bottom and the other which is bottom-to-top – enables the IDF to rapidly adjust to changes in the competitive environment. This capability also enables the IDF to replicate success across the entire organization and nearly eliminate risk of repeating past failures.

A culture that encourages decision-making through consensus, as opposed to an organization chart, creates additional challenges for leaders, but it also requires subordinates to perform at a much higher level than would otherwise be expected.

Within the IDF and the Israeli public, there is widespread recognition that the bottom-to-top framework is the locus of all innovation, the key to quality decision-making, and the engine for ensuring continuous competitive advantage over the IDF’s opponents. This recognition makes it easy for senior leaders to trust subordinates and respect them as equals.

As compared to any other large organization, the IDF benefits from an unrivalled level of trust between the senior leadership and the lowest ranking members of the organization. This is the result of another cultural trait that is unique to the IDF – public accountability of failures, mistakes, and misjudgments.

In most organizations, individuals at all levels within a hierarchy fear public exposure of mistakes because they assume that missteps will reflect poorly on their judgment and will potentially place their professional growth at risk. The IDF emphasizes the criticality of public accountability and has created a system that encourages new recruits, young officers, and generals to clearly identify errors and discuss lessons learned. This system dramatically improves the relationship between leaders and subordinates while helping to ensure that an organization doesn’t replicate past mistakes.

The IDF, which operates on a scale that is comparable to the world's largest corporations, is not perfect – no organization is – but it has achieved success and leadership in a field that requires constant adaption. Its unique culture empowers soldiers to think critically and take command – as opposed to just following orders.

For organizations that are attempting to transform themselves into a learning organization with a high performance culture or are focusing on leadership development, the IDF provides insights that extend well-beyond standard research on these topics. In addition, the existence of a real-world example may enable leading practitioners in this field to move beyond the relatively narrow scope of current efforts and finally achieve the fundamental changes they have sought for over a decade.

French Ceasefire Surrenders Opportunity for Strategic Victory

Israeli military and political leaders have acted wisely in the planning and execution of this operation. They have clearly learned from mistakes made during the 2006 conflict with Hezbollah, but Israeli leaders seem to be on the verge of missing the opportunity to achieve a strategic victory – to end Hamas rule in Gaza and eliminate its military organization.

Contrary to popular opinion, there are military solutions to political problems. The US military surge in Iraq created the conditions for stability and political progress in Iraq. Likewise, the continuation of the current IDF operation in Gaza will create conditions for political progress between Israelis and Palestinians. Ironically, the calls to stop fighting and start talking will lead to further bloodshed – and not just between Israelis and Palestinians. The strongest voices in favor of a ceasefire are from countries that are thousands of miles away from the actual conflict. Those neighboring governments most affected by Hamas rule over the Gaza Strip – the Palestinian Authority (PA) and Egypt – are not nearly as keen about the ceasefire and have both been very critical of Hamas.

For the PA, the internationally recognized government and leadership of the Palestinian people, Hamas is the organization that removed it from power in Gaza by way of a military coup. During the first day of the Israeli operation, a leading member of the PA stated that they would be ready to take control of Gaza if Israel dislodges Hamas. For Egypt, Hamas is an armed off-shoot and strong supporter of the Muslim Brotherhood, the Mubarak regime’s primary political competitor. And all Sunni Arab regimes considered moderate by the western world – from Saudi Arabia and Jordan to Bahrain – would view the destruction of Hamas as a valuable blow to the growing Iranian Shi’a threat.

The French ceasefire proposal would actually ensure the survival of an organization that is officially designated – by the French, the European Union, and the United States – a terrorist organization.

Even a brief ceasefire provides Hamas with time to reorganize, plan, reassert control over Gaza, and ready itself for future attacks. Hamas will not be satisfied with being the de facto rulers of Gaza. The West Bank -- where analysts believe Hamas would already have control if it were not for the Israeli military presence in the area – is next. Future attacks on Israel are assured and attempts to destabilize moderate regimes like Jordan and Egypt are likely.

A ceasefire only postpones the inevitable conflict between Israel and Hamas. Better for Israel to finish off Hamas now than wait until later, when Hamas has become more powerful – politically and militarily. A ceasefire under current conditions would greatly enhance Hamas political clout, just as it did for Hezbollah. And no matter what controls are discussed, Hamas will re-arm.

Given the recognition by foreign governments that Israel is justified in its determination to neuter Hamas military capabilities and the fact that the destruction of Hamas is also in the vested interest of Israel’s Arab neighbors, Israel has the legitimacy required to replicate the successful strategy of Operation Defensive Shield.

As with Operation Defensive Shield in 2002, Israel should call up an additional 20,000 reservists and deploy them alongside 15,000 members of its standing army. Together, these ground forces will be able to rapidly dominate Gaza. Once Hamas is removed as a threat, the PA will immediately assert itself as the legal authority to administer the rebuilding of Gaza. Arab nations like Saudi Arabia and Western donor nations will welcome PA control over Gaza and will donate funds to enable reconstruction. The PA would not reject the opportunity to regain control over Gaza because of the perception that it relied on – and therefore would become associated with -- an Israeli military operation to achieve this goal. The desire to be the sole ruler of all Palestinian people again would override this concern and the PA would counter-balance this perception by its statements and actions. No one will mistake the PA for an Israeli surrogate – in many ways this type of arrangement between the PA and Israel in the West Bank today.

While the PA military and police forces – especially those trained recently by US General Jones – assert control over Gaza, IDF forces would need to continue conducting pinpoint operations to ensure that Hamas is unable to reconstitute itself. As with the West Bank today, Israeli intelligence and infantry units would conduct these ongoing counter-insurgency operations while the PA administers the day-to-day life of the Palestinian civilian population, including coordination with Israel to open the border crossings. The Israeli military operations would be continuous, but they would not necessarily require a base of operations with Gaza once PA forces enter.

To ensure the legitimacy of the PA, planned elections for 2009 should go ahead, but with one small change. Organizations that fail to meet the international standards for a Palestinian government – the willingness to accept prior agreements signed by the PA, the recognition of Israel, and the renunciation of terrorism – will not be able to participate in Palestinian national elections. This will eliminate Hamas from the process and ensure that the current PA leadership the opportunity to finalize a peace agreement with Israel and significantly improve the lives of the Palestinian people.

The cost in Israeli lives to dismantle Hamas and essentially liberate the Gaza Strip for the Palestinian Authority may be high. As a reserve soldier who would likely participate in that operation, I believe that the long-term security gained for both Israelis and Palestinians would justify the cost.
If instead, Israel and the international community revert to policies that have consistently failed in the past, we will have missed a historic opportunity to create a catalyst for peace, will weaken the position of moderate Arab nations, and strengthen the determination of Islamic radicals to confront the West.

When To Cease Fire

The Israeli military has racked up several remarkable achievements in the last week, but the hard part is still ahead of us – and I’m not just referring to the ground invasion. Israeli leaders must withstand the mounting pressure to halt the operation prematurely.

Moments after Israel launched its operation, European leaders were calling on Israel to stop. They were not alone. Leaders and groups from across the world are calling on Israel to halt its military operations. The response of these nations and groups are reflexive and expected. This is how the West reacts to violence in the Middle East. The mantra is “Stop fighting. Start talking.”

That’s a nice sentiment when you’re at café, university, park, or government office thousands of miles away from the actual conflict. Egypt borders both Israel and Gaza. They explicitly blame Hamas, have shown considerable understanding of Israel’s actions, and call on Hamas – not Israel – to unilaterally halt its attacks. Palestinian leaders in the West Bank bluster, but they were eager to mention on the first day of Israel’s operation that they are ready to take control of Gaza if Israel dislodges Hamas.

The governments most affected by Hamas rule over the Gaza Strip – the Palestinian Authority and Egypt – aren’t suggesting that Israel engage Hamas in dialogue. They understand something that much of the Western world has still failed to internalize – you can’t convince Islamic radicals to stop being Islamic radicals. I am not suggesting that Islamic radicals aren’t rational. They are very rational and many of their leaders are politically sophisticated. It’s just that their strongly held beliefs – which are essentially incomprehensible to a Western mind that has detached itself from religious and ideological thinking – lead them to see Israel as a cancer and the West as a poison that must be eradicated at all costs.

No one is going to convince the Hamas leadership to live side-by-side with Israel in peace and harmony. That is never going to happen. If they agreed to live side by side with Israel – something they have rejected continuously – they wouldn’t be Hamas anymore. That’s why nothing can be gained by entering into dialogue with them and that’s why violence is sometimes necessary. In this case, conflict between Israel and Hamas might be critical to the achievement of peace between Israel and the Palestinians. The destruction of Hamas and the subsequent re-introduction of Palestinian Authority control over Gaza would enable forward momentum in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process that is currently not possible.

Even a brief ceasefire provides Hamas with time to reorganize, plan, and ready itself for additional attacks. A longer ceasefire – that leaves Hamas intact as the de facto rulers of Gaza – only postpones the inevitable conflict between Israel and Hamas. Better for Israel to finish off Hamas now than wait until later, when Hamas has become more powerful.

The cost in Israeli lives to dismantle Hamas and essentially liberate the Gaza Strip for the Palestinian Authority may be high. As a reserve soldier, who is likely to put on his uniform in the weeks to come, I can honestly say that achieving that objective would justify the cost.

At this stage, taking away Hamas control over Gaza is not the stated objective of the Israeli government. Their goals are more modest. They want to cause Hamas to re-evaluate their strategy of firing daily rockets at Israeli cities. There is precedence for this approach. In 2004, Israel caused Hamas to re-evaluate its strategy of sending suicide bombers into Israeli cities by killing Hamas leaders Yassin and Rantisi in quick succession. It is possible that today’s Hamas leaders, fearing for their lives and realizing that they are in danger of losing political power over Gaza, will meet Israel’s minimum requirement – which is to stop firing rockets and mortars at Israeli cities.

If that is the primary goal of Israel’s leadership, then they should not deploy Israeli ground troops en mass. Instead, they should continue conducting pinpoint missions that are aimed at specific Hamas leaders and institutions until the remaining Hamas leaders give in.
This approach could give Israel another year of relative quiet in the South, but the country will be eventually forced to deal with Hamas since the Palestinian Authority is unable to reconstitute itself in Gaza on its own. The cost in human life will be lower today – for both Palestinians and Israelis – than in the future. Also, success in Gaza will serve to augment Israeli deterrence with Hezbollah, Syria, and Iran. A strong Israeli deterrence is what keeps future wars from occurring.
Israeli political and military leaders must resist calls – by either foreign interested parties or internal audiences – to accept ceasefire proposals that don’t meet the minimum requirement of an immediate cessation of hostilities on the part of Hamas and a mechanism for ensuring that Hamas does not re-arm.

To achieve that end, the Israeli military can either continue targeted killings of high ranking Hamas officials while destroying Hamas symbols of power until the organization concedes defeat or the Israeli military must employ enough combat troops to enable rapid IDF domination of the Gaza Strip.

Thousands of Palestinians Marching to Israel from Lebanon. That’s Good News for Peace.

According to media reports, Palestinian Authority leaders will stage a media event on May 14th that is meant to embarrass Israel. They are encouraging 100,000 Palestinians in Lebanon to march to the border and stage a protest.

Given that this is Israel’s 60th Independence Day, media outlets around the world would embrace the juxtaposition. If the march takes place and everyone fills their role as expected, the Palestinians will bask in the glory of their misery as seemingly hard-hearted Israelis refuse them entry. Meanwhile, protests throughout the West Bank and elsewhere will call for the end of the “occupation.”

It’s ironic, because Israel is under continuous attack from the Hamas government ruling Gaza and from terror organizations supported and celebrated by the Fatah government ruling the West Bank. The key word in the previous sentence is “government.” In all the calls to end the “occupation,” Israel’s detractors ignore the fact that Palestinians have been actually ruled by their own representatives since 1993. That’s nearly 15 years. Moreover, those very same people marching toward Israel would be citizens living in Palestine today, had the Palestinian Authority come to terms with Israel seven years ago at Camp David.

PA Deputy Minister Ziad Abu Ein, who drew up the plan, calls on Palestinians to “invade” Israel. He says that his plan is to unilaterally implement UN Resolutions 194 – which states that refugees wishing to return to their homes and live in peace with their neighbors should be allowed to do so.

Instead of enabling the Palestinian Authority to create a media circus that only serves to increase the misery of their people, Israel should fully embrace this plan. Israel should work with the UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) and the Lebanese government to facilitate the stated desire of these people to reach Palestine.

Lebanon, which has refused to give citizenship and full rights to these people for decades, will very likely support this initiative. And UNRWA, which provides identity cards and social services for the Palestinians living in Lebanon, will be able to provide Israel with information and documents that will help ensure that individuals who pose security risks are denied access. The Palestinian Authority, which has invited these people to join their brethren, should welcome them. Although it would require a massive effort on Israel’s part, it would be possible for the Israeli security forces to vet individuals, issue new ID cards, and transport them to Jenin. Thereafter, the Palestinian Authority can determine how best to house, employ, and integrate these new immigrants – much as Israel has done since before its founding.

The Palestinian Authority has dubbed this plan, “The Initiative of Return and Coexistence.” If it goes according to plan, divisiveness and disappointment will only increase. The Palestinian Authority prefers to resettle these people within Israel’s borders, just as many Israelis would prefer to retain complete control over key cities in the West Bank that are historically significant to the Jewish people, but that isn’t going to happen. Both Israelis and Palestinians are going to have to settle for a practical solution.

If Palestinians living in Lebanon walk or ride to the border as part of this initiative, Israel should welcome them, bring them to one of the major cities controlled by the Palestinian government that invited them, and wish them every success in building a thriving nation like Israel.

Rethinking the US Army
Interesting article by Peter Spiegel and Julian E. Barnes of the Los Angeles Times.

Although it is vital for us to rethink the US Army, I would be concerned about the consequences of creating a force that, according to the quote from Lt. General Caldwell, “…do not do direct action, they do not command and control combat forces, they are not a combat force….” The IDF doesn’t get everything right and it’s not exactly an apples-to-apples comparison, but the primary urban warfare training cadre that provides the initial instruction to all Israeli special forces/operations units also conducts operations on a regular basis to keep skills sharp and curriculum relevant.

This is an expression of an Israeli training methodology that typically integrates real-world experience with instruction. For example, by the first month of basic training, soldiers conduct low-probability-of-contact operations - such as patrols, manning checkpoints, and reconnaissance on relatively pacified villages. This is meant to gradually prepare soldiers for more complex operations and speed integration of newly acquired skills. You practice navigation and surveillance techniques on base during the day and conduct short-range reconnaissance at night.

I agree with Col. Nagl’s assessment that being a trainer/advisor “…requires a different mindset.” As we all know, the best sniper doesn’t always make the best shooting instructor. Being a great trainer requires a set of interpersonal and organizational skills that are independent of subject matter expertise. Teaching an individual to shoot, orienteer, employ communication equipment, and make a tourniquet can be taught well by people with limited field experience. In Israel, female soldiers without combat experience train soldiers on tanks, mortars, and sniping techniques. But you can’t fully instruct or evaluate skills like patrolling, manning checkpoints, counter-IED measures, and CQC in a training facility alone. People who are great at target selection during simulations are not necessarily the most reliable members of a team when in the field because, as we all know, there is a big difference between on-base exercises/simulations and real-world operations - in terms of complexity/psychological pressure and how an individual responds to it. For this reason, a trainer/advisor needs to provide insights, support, and evaluate the competency of commanders and individual soldiers in the field.

Another concerning thought that surfaced in the article was the idea, as stated by Col. Nagl, that “We don't want to do the fighting; we want our friends to do the fighting.” I don’t diminish the genuine importance of having local partners who are able to stand up on their own and assert control/authority over their territory. And believe creating a mechanism to quickly train/stand-up/buttress a local partner is of vital importance to current and future conflicts. That said, US military forces are still going to take a leading role in ensuring public security and defeating threats in most current and future conflicts - at least for an extended period of time while a local partner is trained up (we can’t assume that we’re going to have the capability or foresight to train up these local partners in time to forestall an outbreak of violence). For this reason, even if we were to establish a force dedicated to the training of US partners, it would not change the need to make other changes to force structure, leadership development, training methods, training curriculum, strategies, etc that will enable the US military to become even more effective practitioners of COIN and asymmetric warfare.

Perhaps I’m giving these sentiments, as expressed by Col Nagl, more weight than he intended, but thinking that the US military will forestall conflict and/or empower weak states primarily by training up local forces minimizes the complexity of most any future conflict we’re likely to encounter.

For example, even if we successfully cycle hundreds of thousands of local Iraqis through a highly improved training regimen and give them the highest rating in terms of ability to conduct a wide range of operations that ensure public safety, it does not necessarily follow that the Iraqi government will use this military force in an ethnically neutral way that promotes national unity, undercuts sectarian strife, diminishes the negative influences of countries like Iran, or changes the perception of the US as an occupying power that exerts undue influence over Iraq.
Certainly, improved US training capabilities will increase the military capabilities and professionalism of partners, but that does not necessarily mean that they are going to take decisive action. Without the right political framework, clear direction from a central government, and extensive civilian agreement on national priorities, it may not matter how well our partners are trained. As an organization, they still may not perform as we’d expect and like them to in the field because their effectiveness will depend not only on their ability to fight, but also on their legitimacy in the eyes of the civilian population, the political will of civilian leaders, and the belief by individual soldiers/commanders that orders received reflect both personal and national interest.

For that reason, the role of US diplomats, US civil affairs personnel, media, NGOs, etc will continue to play as vital a role as our highly-dedicated trainers/advisors in making sure that a partner’s military reaches the level of professionalism desired and demonstrates a willingness to take on the hard tasks that lead to a desirable political end-state. As a result, the military will still need to acquire new competencies, consider changes to force structure/resource allocation, and dramatically increase the level of “jointness.” Although this may be self-evident, I am a little concerned that the creation of a dedicated training corps is being perceived as a game-changing solution that mitigates the need to make many of the far-reaching changes that have been proposed and studied over the last few years.

For instance, will any new model give equal weight to non-kinetic capabilities - like development, civil affairs, and strategic communications - that are as vital to the successful prosecution of counter-insurgency, nation-building, and/or stability operations as the number of boots on the ground?

In many current and future conflicts, development projects that improve quality of life can be critical to the success of the overall mission. But since these NGOs and development agencies are unable to secure their work environments or personnel, many projects never get implemented. If these projects were considered a critical component of a battle plan or military campaign, the necessary security and logistics required for implementation would be more readily available. As long as these non-kinetic elements are not integrated within the overall strategy from the outset and included in operation plans, many of them will not be accomplished. And this could have a negative impact on the mission as a whole. For this reason, it may be incumbent on the US military to either dramatically increase its competency in this area or, at least, better integrate with the NGOs/development organizations during the strategy development and operation planning phases.

That said, Lebanon may be a good laboratory for testing how far the training and arming of a local partner - as the primary role of the US military - can go in helping to establish central authority. With some help, the Lebanese Army recently asserted control over the weakest population segment and succeeded in destroying the infrastructure of a very small militia. In and of itself, this was a big first step for this fractured country. It’s possible that this military, if further strengthened with more arms, training, and direct support, could assert control over more hotly contested territory with larger and more lethal militias like Hezbollah. I’m not sure they could, in the near term, even make the attempt without direct military support from the US, Israel, or an Arab-led coalition. Recent comments by anti-Syrian parliamentarians like Walid Jumblatt and Hariri suggest that the Lebanese believe this to be true. Unlike Iraq, Lebanon (despite the fractured nature of the country and perhaps because of exhaustion after decades of civil war) may have a clear majority of citizens that would welcome a strong, relatively secular government that asserts central control. In this way, Lebanon is not as complex as Iraq. It may just require increasing the capabilities of the existing military, encouraging leaders to continue to publicly resist Syrian/Iranian influence, and position operations as the best path to achieving the national unity that is strongly desired by civilians throughout the country.

In the future, one would expect that there will be a wide range of situations and conflicts that will require the support, if not outright intervention, of the US military. In some cases, like Iraq, the full spectrum of US political, economic, and military levers will be required. Other cases, like Lebanon, may mostly require the supply of additional arms and military training in order to achieve the desired political end-state. And there will be the majority of cases whose requirements will be somewhere in between. For instance, US support for a western-leaning government may take the form of providing logistical support and security for ongoing development projects that are critical to achieving political goals.

Although improving training capabilities is certainly important and valuable, I see it as being only one of several equally important areas where the US military needs to reallocate resources and enable change. And for what it’s worth, I do think that trainers/advisors need to fight alongside their trainees in order to evaluate the relevance of curriculum, measure troop capabilities, provide immediate feedback, and demonstrate support.

Political Consequences of Military Operations in the Long War: The Israeli Perspective, 2000-2007.
I first gave this lecture at the US Army's 2007 Combat Studies Institute Symposium. This presentation details Israeli central political objectives between 2000 – 2007, key military operations and the associated political consequences, lessons learned, implications for the US military, and what Israel should learn from US experience in Iraq. This presentation is based on my experiences with the Israeli Special Forces between 1990-2003 and consulting for the US military between 2003-2007. It includes a 6 month estimate on the political situation and likely military operations.

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