Wednesday, February 22, 2012

Harnessing The Arab Spring To Solve The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

Israeli and Palestinian leaders have been negotiating for seventeen years, but they are no closer to a peace agreement today than they were on May 4th, 1994 when Israel let the PLO set up a proto-state in the West Bank and Gaza.

Israeli and Palestinian leaders have tried direct negotiations, US-led negotiations, and multinational negotiations that have included the US, EU, Russia, and the UN. The Palestinians and Israelis have both tried the use of force. They have both taken unilateral steps.

The failure of these approaches has been inevitable because the Palestinians don’t feel like the magnitude of their experience or the scope of their aspirations is being fully addressed.

At the same time, Israelis have good reason to believe that the Palestinians are still not ready to accept the legitimacy of Israel as the rightful homeland of the Jewish people. Despite this concern, the Israeli people and the last five Israeli Prime Ministers, including Benjamin Netanyahu, have all been ready to make a deal.

Israeli leaders have put forth a number of plans that essentially give Palestinians full control and statehood over 97% of the West Bank. Israel has asked for the 3%, where the vast majority of Israeli settlements can be found. In exchange, Israel gives the Palestinians 3% of undisputed Israeli territory to physically connect the West Bank and Gaza into a unified state. Even on Jerusalem, successive Israeli governments have shown willingness to draw the border between Israel and Palestine in ways that would enable both sides to claim Jerusalem as their capital.

When Israelis ask themselves why Palestinian leaders refuse to accept negotiated terms that seem reasonable to them, the EU, and the US, they typically assume that the Palestinian simply don't want genuine peace with Israel. I’ve certainly thought that and it very well may be true. The continuous Palestinian state-sponsored incitement against Jews and their leadership’s official celebration of individuals who murder children makes it hard to argue that they seek peace.

Even so, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict isn’t going to solve itself or become easier to manage by trying to wait it out. Part of the problem is that Israel has never been – and never will be – in a position to fully satisfy the needs of the Palestinian people. The West Bank and Gaza really isn’t enough. They need and deserve Amman too.

While the world celebrates the fall of Arab dictators like Mubarak and Gaddafi, world leaders sit down for lunch with Jordanian King Abdullah II. Abdullah II is much more congenial than Bashar Assad, the Syrian dictator who has hired Iranian and Hezbollah thugs to kill civilians, but the two have a lot in common. They both rely on security services to remain in power and lead a small minority tribe that rules over a majority.In Syria, the Allawi tribe is 10% of the total population. In Jordan, the Bedouin tribe is 20% of the total population. 80% of Jordanians self-identify as Palestinian.

This comes as no surprise given that Churchill “created Jordan with the stroke of a pen one Sunday afternoon” in 1921 to reward Abdullah Hussein for his support during World War I. The British made him King and the Bedouin minority have been ruling over the Palestinian majority ever since.

The Palestinians call the war waged against Israel’s existence in 1948 “The Catastrophe,” but the greatest blow to their national aspirations actually occurred in 1921 when Britain gave away 70% of their land to Abdullah. Today, there are more Palestinians living in Jordan than in the West Bank.

No one wants to pressure Jordan’s King Abdullah II to abdicate. Other Arab dictators believe it will accelerate their own departure from power. U.S. and European leaders don’t want to dismantle a relatively stable and friendly Arab nation, especially during a particularly tumultuous period in the Middle East. Of course, the same could have been said about Mubarak before the US government decided to take away some of his few remaining lifelines.

From the Israeli perspective, the Jordanian monarchy has been relatively non-belligerent for decades and they don’t want to rock the boat. Palestinians remain publically quiet regarding their historic claims to Jordan. In time, we’ll see the extent by which they are biding their time until the conflict with Israel is resolved.

The Jordanian monarchy will eventually fall. The Arab Spring revolutions in Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, and Syria demonstrate that it’s inevitable, especially given the Jordanian lack of legitimacy and its lack of the economic resources needed to hold onto power. The Saudis can buy their people’s love. The Jordanians can barely afford to buy their people a stick of gum. It is just a question of time.

Regional and world powers must decide whether they want to proactively enable an orderly transition in Jordan that has a positive impact on the region or face the chaos, risk, and uncertainty that will result from the inevitable overthrow of the Jordanian monarchy.

Including Jordan as part of the final settlement with Israel won’t replace the need for Israeli-Palestinian negotiations over core issues like Jerusalem, the West Bank, Gaza, and the Palestinian diaspora. Extreme right wing elements in Israel have talked about transferring Palestinians to Jordan. No Israeli leader has endorsed this concept and a vast majority of Israelis reject this approach out of hand.

I am not suggesting deportations or population transfers. I am suggesting that the Palestinians be given full authority over both the West and East Bank (Jordan) as well as Gaza. The Palestinians still get the vast majority of the West Bank and Gaza as envisioned in prior negotiations with Israel. They just also get Jordan too.

Widening the vision of peace to include Palestinian sovereignty over Jordan is the best way to narrow the gap between what the Palestinians want and what they will receive. It won’t diminish the desire of many Palestinians to return to villages left in 1948, but the sheer size and potential of a Palestinian state that is nearly five times the size of Israel should enable the vast majority of Palestinians to feel like they are receiving a fair deal.

World leaders have pressured Mubarak, Gaddafi, and Assad to abdicate power without having a clear understanding of the day-after impact on Egypt, Libya, Syria, and the region as a whole. In the instance of Jordan, the impact on the region is clear, controllable, and transformative.

Abdullah II recently said he’d step down if he experienced the kind of resistance Bashar Assad currently faces in Syria. He has opened the door for the kind of discussion that needs to take place between world leaders and Jordan.

If world leaders actually believe that solving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is critical to achieving stability in the region and think that it will reduce the rationale for global Islamic terrorism, then they must pressure King Abdullah II to abdicate power in Jordan and enable a handoff of sovereignty to the Palestinians as part of a comprehensive peace deal with Israel.

It will increase the viability of a Palestinian state and help end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The sooner that happens, the better life will be for Palestinians, Israelis, the Middle East, and the world.

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Tuesday, August 28, 2007

Recycled Solutions Won’t Stop the Cycle of Violence

Once again, Israelis and Palestinians are on the verge of another international conference, more confidence building measures, and leaders are making statements designed to prepare Israelis and Palestinians for political concessions. It could be 1991 just before the Madrid Conference, 1993 after Oslo, 2000 at Camp David, Wye River, Sharm el-Sheikh, or Taba.

Instead of a Nobel Prize winning Rabin-Arafat handshake on the White House lawn, Israeli Prime Minister Olmert and Palestinian President Abbas talk quietly in Jericho about security coordination, reducing the Israeli military presence in the West Bank, and a final status agreement. Israeli and Palestinian leaders seem to think that it’s possible and advisable to turn back the clock to 2000, but the same obstacles to peace still remain, new challenges have emerged, and the last seven years of conflict have lessened public readiness to make peace.

By merely retracing the steps taken by their predecessors, today’s leaders virtually guarantee that the cycle of violence will continue and that their citizens will needlessly endure additional years of bloody conflict.

Ironically, the deal has already been struck, if not signed. The Palestinians will have a contiguous state that spans the West Bank and Gaza. Israel will give up a portion of its territory to make that possible. In exchange, the Palestinians will accept that an equal amount of West Bank territory will become part of Israel. In addition, the Palestinians and Israelis will share Jerusalem and a just solution for Palestinians living abroad will be found. This is inevitable, but it will be further delayed years, if not decades, because Olmert and Abbas continue to follow a process that is unnecessary and fundamentally flawed.

Today, as with the 90’s, the Israeli-Palestinian peace process has two tracks. One track focuses on confidence building measures like the removal of checkpoints, prisoner releases, economic aid, members of terror organizations symbolically relinquishing arms, and limited security cooperation. Meanwhile, another track concentrates on the broader core issues like national borders, Jerusalem, and the future of Palestinians living abroad. In theory, the process builds momentum for peace and progress on one track helps support movement on the other.

Unfortunately, Oslo demonstrated that this step-by-step, drawn-out process does not work in the real world. History shows that Palestinian opposition groups, acting to derail the process and challenge the Palestinian Authority leadership, will carry out a number of terror attacks that force an Israeli military response. As the frequency of Palestinian attacks and the tempo of Israeli military responses increase, political concessions are harder to make. The inevitable failure to achieve results on the confidence building track undermines the entire process. In the end, political progress halts and violence intensifies.

In the 90’s, Hamas suicide bombers played a key role in making the Oslo Peace Process drag on for over seven years. Now Hamas controls Gaza and is strengthening its position in the West Bank. Meanwhile, Abbas is even losing control over Fatah-sponsored terror groups, like the Al-Aksa Brigades. Today’s relative calm will not last long.

For this reason, it is vital that Israeli and Palestinian leaders take immediate steps to dramatically change Israeli-Palestinian relations. A true rapprochement between these two nations is possible, but it will require a willingness on both sides to take genuine risks.

The key to success depends on a Palestinian leadership that is willing to fully embrace collaboration with Israel. Palestinian Authority leaders must make a steady stream of public announcements and enact policies that enable the Palestinian people to understand that the era of Israeli-Palestinian conflict is over and has been replaced by a strategic alliance that is critical to the establishment of a Palestinian state.

The centerpiece of this alliance will be the training of a professional Palestinian military by Israeli soldiers and a comprehensive economic development program for the West Bank and Gaza that is jointly administered by the Palestinian Authority and Israel.

The risks are clear. Palestinian Authority leaders would become politically vulnerable at a time when they need all of their strength to consolidate power. Moreover, opposition groups may consider Palestinian Authority leaders legitimate military targets. In addition, Palestinian leaders would have to relinquish their strongest propaganda tool, the rhetoric and policies of a resistance movement. For Israel, the risks include the very real possibility that a much improved Palestinian military would be more difficult to subdue if the conflict resumes. Also, given that Palestinian soldiers have attacked Israeli soldiers during joint patrols in the past, Israeli soldiers would face the possibility of being shot by presumed allies during training and joint operations.

The benefits are equally clear. Without the assistance of a robust external military force, the western-leaning Palestinian Authority will not gain central control over all of its people and it will soon lose its battle with radical groups like Hamas and Islamic Jihad. Israel is the only country in the world that has both the military capability and the willingness to take on Hamas. Working together, the Palestinian Authority and the Israeli military can defeat the radical Islamic organizations and keep them from rising again.

Further, Palestinians need to see Israelis in new, positive ways that are condoned by Palestinian political and cultural leaders. Israel has a better track record than Europe when it comes to managing development projects and stimulating an economy that lacks natural resources. Given Israel’s capabilities, deep interest, and the need to transform Israeli-Palestinian relations, Israelis should be collaborating directly with Palestinians on development projects, not just interested parties from Europe and America.

Any dramatic step forward would require the active support of American and European leaders. Moreover, Palestinian leaders would need assurance that neighbors like Lebanon, Jordan, and Egypt as well as Gulf states like Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain, UAE, and Kuwait all vocally support the Palestinian alliance with Israel against radical Islamists and avidly refute any suggestion of capitulation or weakness on the part of the Palestinian Authority. They must be willing to broadcast on their national radio and television news programs images of Israeli and Palestinian soldiers squaring off together against radical groups like Hamas, while providing commentary that supports those efforts. After all, the de-legitimization of radical groups like Hamas and Islamic Jihad are in their national interests as well, given the growing strength of similar groups in their own countries.

The Palestinian people are the most free, secular, homogenous, and educated population in the Arab world. They want a central, democratic, and relatively secular government. If the radical Islamists are not defeated soon, this will never be achieved. And even though Israelis have built a thriving economy and one of the most liberal democracies in the world, the country yearns to live in peace with its neighbors.

Israelis and Palestinians can both achieve their national aspirations. All it takes is the willingness to collaborate and end this cycle of violence.

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