What if Bush is Right?
Given the false claims regarding WMD, the cynical blurring of Al Qaeda and Saddam Hussein, the hubris of deploying only 20% of the troops needed for post-war stabilization, and the daily loss of life, it’s easy to be a critic of US policy in Iraq.

After more than three years of increasing violence, it is abundantly clear that U.S. and Iraqi forces are not going to create stability in Iraq. And at last, the US government is ready to reevaluate its strategy. This is a good thing.

But the highly partisan debate – both domestically and internationally – has stymied thinking. U.S. leaders, European politicians, Middle East rulers, and UN diplomats have only come up with two solutions. U.S. forces should either stay or they should go.

Ironically, there is wide consensus that a reduction in US military presence in Iraq will cause the country to fall further into chaos until a civil war either fragments the country or enables a winner to take all. In either case, the Sunni-Shia violence in Iraq – that is already to some extent a proxy war between Iran and Saudi Arabia – will likely spill across the rest of the region.

Frustration with this administration’s failure to achieve economic, political, or military results makes people eager for a solution. Any solution. And in a political environment that seems to suggest that we either have to stay the course or get out of dodge, the latter certainly seems the most sensible choice.

But what if President Bush is right and we must achieve victory in Iraq.

Iraq had nothing to do with the War on Terror before we arrived, but it does now. The US must remain completely engaged in the creation of a thriving, stable democracy in Iraq. Not only because of a kindergarten logic that dictates that we clean up our mess before we leave, but because failure will encourage nations challenging the U.S. to follow through on plans that will make the world less stable and Islamic radicals will redouble their efforts against Western culture through terrorism and intimidation.

We’ve arrived at a turning point in Iraq, but what happens next will directly impact U.S. security and its place in the world for decades to come.

The choice is not between staying or going, it’s between an escalating violence that extends beyond the region or increasing the number of boots on the ground. That leaves us with only two questions. How many and where from.

The number of troops required is already known. General Shinseki told U.S. decision-makers three years ago that we’d need several hundred thousand troops. The Brookings Institute has estimated that at least 400,000 soldiers would be needed, based on the size and population of Iraq.

Those numbers aren’t just part of an academic exercise. Between 2000-2002 there was a steady up-tick in suicide bombings within Israel, culminating in daily attacks by the spring of 2002. Israel launched Operation Defensive Shield to retake control over the West Bank using 20,000 reservists. By maintaining troop levels over the years, Israel has reduced the number of successful Palestinian attacks by over 90%. To have the same level of physical coverage over Iraq as Israel has over the West Bank, the U.S. would need approximately 500,000 troops. A surge of 20,000-30,000 additional troops – which represents only a 15-20% increase – is too small to have a net positive impact on stability.

The Iraq Study Group – which is comprised of 9 politicians, 1 judge, and no military strategists – recommends withdrawal and a regional conference with all the players. Dozens of these conferences have been tried before without result. Just ask Mr. Baker about Madrid. Besides, if we don’t have the power, the influence, or a strategy to effect positive change in Iraq, what makes us think we can fix the region as a whole? The US military has a number of forums, like the Unified Quest Seminar Series, that bring together experienced military, law enforcement, and development professionals to discuss strategy and tactics. The findings of these seminars need to play a more prominent role in planning.

Instead of opening up a diplomatic channel that will enable Iran to achieve its nuclear ambitions and Syria to regain control over Lebanon, diplomatic efforts should focus on gaining commitments for additional troops on the ground.

And with additional troops, the U.S. will finally be able to focus attention on our primary task, which is nation-building. Earlier this year, the US State Department considered absorbing USAID in order to streamline US development projects throughout the world and better align these projects with US foreign policy. Great idea. Wrong agency. Instead of merging USAID with the State Department, we should tightly integrate USAID with the military. Development projects in Iraq fail because the country lacks security. And as Catch 22 would have it, Iraq lacks security, in part, because development projects aren’t able to improve the lives of the country’s citizens.

Instead of making the reduction of violence in a particular town or region a battalion’s mission, let’s make the successful implementation of a regional school system the primary military objective. And make a countrywide development strategy the framework for the military, whereby military plans serve mainly to facilitate logistics and provide security for these programs.

We must remind the Europeans that a destabilized Middle East will be harmful to their interests and we must convince them to share the burden more equally. And within the region itself, instead of focusing on the countries that are trying to thwart us at every turn, we should turn to Saudi Arabia and other gulf states that have a vested interest in the success of Iraq. They already know that a US withdrawal will devastate the region and may be willing to participate. And Egypt, which has one of the most powerful military forces in the region, is eager to demonstrate its leadership to the Arab world. We should let them.

We don’t need a Coalition of the Willing that provides token political and military support. We must lobby for committed allies who understand the importance of success and who want Iraq to succeed just as much as we do.

With enough boots on the ground and a comprehensive strategy for nation-building, Iraq can still become a success story.